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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the effect of attrition on USMCR NPS marines who enlisted with a 
6X2 contract in FY 1994–2005.  Three cohorts were established to determine if the 
events of September 11, 2001 had any impact on attrition rates with this population.  The 
Pre-9/11 cohort enlisted in FY 1994–1995 and was used as a control group.  The 
Overlap-9/11 cohort enlisted in FY 1996–2001, had no expectation of deployment but 
many did deploy in support of the Global War on Terrorism.  The Post-9/11 cohort 
enlisted in FY 2002–2005 after 9/11 with full expectation to deploy. 
 The analysis included previous attrition studies, descriptive statistics, and two 
different probit regression models to determine the effects of various characteristics on 
attrition.  The variables analyzed included deployment variables, demographics, 
education and aptitude variables, and regional areas. 
The thesis found a decrease in attrition from the Pre-9/11 cohort to the Post-9/11 
cohort.  This was most likely caused by an increasing unemployment rate and 
deployments overseas.  Deployments to combat areas decreased the probability of 
attrition.  The other variables remained constant throughout the cohorts with predicted 
results. Overall, attrition is lower after 9/11 but as the economy improves and 
deployments decrease, attrition could return to Pre-9/11 levels. 
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The goal of this thesis is to determine the determinants of attrition on the United 
States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) non-prior service (NPS) marines with a 6X2 
contract who enlisted from 1994 through 2005.  The analysis revolves around the events 
of September 11, 2001 to determine if characteristics of the population related to attrition 
are different before and after the terrorist attacks on the American homeland.  The 
population is divided into three cohorts; the Pre-9/11 cohort (used as a control group) 
enlisted in FY 1994 and 1995 and completed their 6-year obligation prior to 9/11, the 
Overlap-9/11 cohort (had no expectation of deployment) enlisted between FY 1996 and 
2001 (before 9/11) and whose 6-year commitment expired sometime after 9/11, and the 
Post-9/11 cohort (expected to deploy) enlisted in FY 2002–2005 after 9/11.  Numerous 
variables are analyzed including, deployment characteristics, demographics, education 
and aptitude variables, and regional differences. 
The thesis consists of six chapters.  Chapter I is an introduction and background 
of the USMCR.  Chapter II is a Literature Review of previous studies, focused on active 
duty and reserve attrition.  Chapter III is the definition of all the variables which are 
discussed in the analysis.  Chapter IV is the beginning of the analysis with summary 
statistics of the data collected on the reservists.  Chapter V is the regression analysis 
using probit models to predict the effects of various variables on attrition. Lastly, Chapter 





Note:  Components highlighted in yellow (*) are elements of the RASL. 
Figure 1.   Components of the USMCR (From MCO 1001R.1K, 2009, March) 
A. RESERVE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 
As depicted in Figure 1, the Marine Corps Reserve is composed of three main 
components: The Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.  The 
mission of the Reserve Component of the Marine Corps Total Force is to augment and 
reinforce the Active Component (AC) with trained units and qualified individuals in a 
time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as national security may 
require.  The Marine Corps Reserve complements the Marine Corps operating force 
structure and capabilities and is able to increase the size of the Marine Corps when called 
upon increasing the capability, flexibility, and depth to the force.   
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The reserves main focus is on planning, training, and administration for total force 
integration in the event of a recall and mobilization. (MCO 1001R.1K, 2009) 
1. Ready Reserve 
The Ready Reserve is composed of the Selected Reserve (SelRes) and the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  These are the reservists who are liable for immediate 
recall to active duty in times of national emergency or war.   
a. Selected Reserve (SelRes) 
The Selected Reserve consists of approximately 39,600 marines and is 
comprised of three components: the Active Reserve (AR), the Selected Marine Corps 
Reserve (SMCR) and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA).  The Active Reserve 
currently consists of approximately 2,261 reservists who serve full time multi-year 
contracts similar to the Active Component (AC) and are responsible for the organization, 
administration, recruitment, retention, instruction and training of members of the Marine 
Corps Reserve. (Flynn, 2011)  The SMCR includes the vast majority of the SelRes and is 
comprised of part-time reservists who generally drill one weekend a month and have a 2 
week annual training event once a year.  IMA reservists are marines from the SelRes who 
serve in a full-time capacity with the active component. The IMA contracts are short 
term, usually 1 year, and support the active components mobilization requirements to 
include combat operations and/or training. 
b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) 
Most AC marines enlist with a 4X4 contract representing 4 years of active 
service and 4 years of Military Service Obligation (MSO) in the IRR.  Most reservists 
enlist with a 6X2 contract with 6 years of service in the Ready Reserve and 2 years of 
MSO in the IRR.  The Individual Ready Reserve consists of marines who have 
previously served in the AC or the SelRes and are available for mobilization, have had 
training, and either have not completed their Military Service Obligation (MSO) or have 
completed their MSO and volunteered to remain in the Ready Reserve.  
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The purpose of the IRR is to have an additional pool of marines available for the 
President to call upon in case of a national emergency.  Unless activated, members of the 
IRR only need to muster once a year and do not drill otherwise.  
2. Standby Reserve 
The Standby Reserve is a pool of marines who are not required to train and are 
not members of specified units, but can be mobilized with the Secretary of Defense’s 
approval as needed in the event of a national emergency.  It consists primarily of officers 
who are unable to meet participation requirements of the Ready Reserve but desire to 
maintain affiliation, or who are still obligated contractually or fail to resign their 
commissions.  There are two categories of Standby Reserve: Active Status List (ASL) 
and Inactive Status List (ISL).  The ASL consists of marines who are designated as key 
federal employees or have been temporarily assigned due to hardship but intend to return 
to the Ready Reserve.  ASL marines are in an active status for purposes of promotion and 
are eligible to participate in reserve training programs for retirement point credit, but do 
not receive pay or allowances.  The ISL consists of reserve officers who desire to 
maintain their reserve affiliation but who have failed to meet the minimum requirements. 
ISL Marines are not eligible to participate, receive pay or retirement credit, or promotion 
consideration. (MCO 1001R.1K, 2009) 
3. Retired Reserve 
The retired reserve consists of Marines who have completed at least 20 years of 
active or qualifying reserve service and requested and been approved for retirement.  The 
four categories of retired reserve Marines are: Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR), 
Retired Reserve Awaiting pay, Retired Reserve in Receipt of Retired Pay, and the 
Regular Retired List.  Marines in the retired reserve may be recalled to active duty 
according to Section 688 of United States Code Title 10.   
4. Non-Prior Service Reservists. 
Because of the scope of this thesis, only non-prior service (NPS) enlisted Marines 
in the Selected Reserve will be analyzed.  Prior Service (PS) Marines, Officers, the 
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Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve are not relevant to the analysis in this thesis.  
Non-prior service (NPS) enlisted Marines are recruited into the USMCR through one of 
four Reserve Optional Enlistment Programs (ROEP).  Each program imposes an eight 
year contract but the amount of time spent drilling in a SMCR unit and time spent in the 
Ready Reserve differs.  Table 1 describes the requirements for each ROEP.  The 
overwhelming majority of ROEP contracts are the 6X2 with over 97 percent of all ROEP 
contracts so designated. (Lizarraga, 2011) 
Table 1.   Reserve Optional Enlistment Program Contract Type (From Lizarraga, 2011, 
March) 
 
5. Current Trends of Reserve Activation. 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990/1991 was the culminating point of a new 
era of reserve participation in global military operations and humanitarian efforts. 
Politically, Americans’ support for military operations is almost essential to employ 
forces.  By employing the reserves, it ensures Americans across the country are directly 
connected to the conflict through friends, relatives, and acquaintances serving with the 
Reserve Components or National Guard.  Desert Storm in 1990/91 and Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom since September 11, 2001 have demonstrated the 
overwhelming support of the conflicts (at least initially) due in part to reserve 
participation.  The USMCR has had on average 6,927 SelRes Marines on activation 
orders from September 2001 through September 2009.  Figure 2 depicts the trends of 
USMCR activation showing a peak in April 2003 of 17,807 USMCR marines on 
activation orders. (Price, 2010) 
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Figure 2.   Post-9/11 Frequency of SelRes Activations (From Price, 2010) 
As identified by Price (2010), the Marine Corps failed to meet its congressionally 
mandated Selected Reserve end strength of 39,600 ± 3 percent in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 
and 2008 and just eked above the lower limit of 38,412 Marines in FY 2009.  These 
shortcomings can be attributed to the rapid expansion of the active duty force from 
175,000 in FY 2006 to 202,000 by FY 2011, which took away potential reserve contracts. 
Lizarraga (2011) discusses other problems needing to be addressed by the Reserves.  
Figure 3 shows the NPS enlisted 6X2 contract attrition and continuation behavior in the 
post 9/11 era.   
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Figure 3.   NPS Continuation Behavior Graph (From Lizarraga, 2011, March) 
The 12-month continuation rate of those marines who complete 6 years of service 
is less than 20 percent.  In addition, the attrition rate of the marines during their 6-year 
obligation is approximately 45–48 percent.  Thus, only 10 percent of NPS enlisted 
marines enlisting with a 6X2 contract remain with their SMCR unit after 7 years.  This 
creates a vacuum for experienced Staff Noncommissioned Officers (SNCO’s) and 
requires additional resources for recruiting efforts to replace those who attrite or choose 
not to continue with the reserves.  The attrition of those who sign up with a 6-year 
contract is a contributing factor to the USMCR missing end state goals.  By analyzing the 
attrition of NPS enlisted marines, the goal of this thesis is to identify characteristics of 
those who attrite and implement recommendations in order to reduce the attrition and 
allow the individuals to successfully complete their contracts. 
There are a number of reasons why a Marine may attrite during his/her first term.  
These reasons can be categorized into “acceptable attrition” and “wasteful attrition.”  
Acceptable attrition occurs when an individual leaves a specific SMCR unit but the 
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Marine Corps retains the individual in other capacities.  An example of acceptable 
attrition is when a marine accepts an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) billet to 
work with another mobilized unit for a specified period of time.  Marines also may leave 
their SelRes unit early if they are accepted in a USMC Officer program, if they transition 
to the active duty forces, conduct an Inter Unit Transfer, or are accepted to the Active 
Reserve (AR) program.  All of these circumstances warrant a loss for the SelRes unit but 
a gain to other USMC programs.  Attrition is considered wasteful when members are 
kicked out of the Marine Corps for disciplinary or legal problems.  Medical discharges 
are also wasteful because they are unforeseen early departures from contracts which 
impact end strength.  Transfer to another service branch is also undesirable attrition 
because it demonstrates disenfranchisement or the lack of the Marine Corps to satisfy the 
individual needs.  Due to data constraints, there is no way to differentiate between 
acceptable and wasteful attrition and thus both are lumped together as attrition. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter examines previous studies pertaining to attrition in the military.  
Attrition studies are prevalent so only attrition studies pertaining to first term enlisted 
attrition are included in this thesis with a focus on reserve components of the military.  
Attrition in the Army Reserve, National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, 
Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve have all been previously addressed with 
emphasis on a number of factors.   
A. ATTRITION STUDIES 
Numerous Attrition studies have been conducted concerning the Active and 
Reserve components of the U.S. Military.  Doering and Grissmer (1985) related reserve 
attrition to major intervening events such as full time work commitments, change in 
marital status during enlistment, birth of children, and migration  When reservists 
experience major intervening events in their life, they are more likely to attrite. (Doering 
& Grissmer, 1985) 
Grissmer and Kirby (1985) followed the FY1980 cohort of Army Reserve and 
Army National Guard NPS enlistees for the first two years of their enlistments to study 
attrition.  They found attrition of 30.6 percent for the National Guard and 39.5 percent for 
the Army Reserve.  Reasonable extrapolations through the six-year enlistment term 
predict an overall attrition rate of 60 percent for guardsmen and 75 percent for Army 
reservists.  The high rate of attrition is attributed to three factors: the quality and 
demographic composition of the cohort; transfers to the active force or to other reserve 
components; and the turbulence of normal civilian life.  Attrition rates were higher for 
those with lower Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores and those without High 
School (HS) diplomas.  Women have attrition rates twice that of men with similar AFQT 
scores, education, and other characteristics.  This is believed to be related to earlier 
marriage and more frequent spousal conflict as well as more frequent geographical moves 
and childbearing.  Those separating to pursue careers in the Active Component equate to 
approximately 20 percent of the Reserve separations, and 13 percent of the Guard 
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separations.  These enlistees going to the Active Component are found to be significantly 
higher quality than the other separations.  The separations related to changes in reservist’s 
civilian life are hypothesized to be related to migration for new civilian job opportunities, 
new marriages and/or increased family size. (Grissmer & Kirby, Attrition of Nonprior-
Service Reservists in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, 1985) 
As a follow up to their previous study in 1985, Grissmer and Kirby (1988) looked 
at multiple cohorts from 1980–1982 to study attrition in the US Army Reserve (USAR) 
and Army National Guard (ANG).  This time, they concentrated only on those who left 
the service to the civilian sector.  Once again, women had a much higher attrition rate 
than males (44 percent compared to 18–28 percent).  This is possibly due to women 
migrating more often and changing jobs and marital status more frequently than men of 
similar age.  In addition, it is believed that pregnancy and added 
responsibilities/expectations of taking care of home and children also impact women’s 
decisions to stay with units. 
To improve upon the previous study, Grissmer and Kirby identified and tracked 
important manpower policy changes which could affect attrition, including training 
standards, attrition discharge policies, and binding budget and end strength constraints.  
In addition, it is important to understand how changing cohort size or quality is affected 
by training.  Because some training is graded using bell curves, a smarter cohort may 
result in attrition of those with higher AFQT scores. 
Although attrition increased from one cohort to the next, the individual 
characteristics related to attrition did not change over time.  They concluded that 
recruiting and training policies can focus on individual characteristics to improve 
efficiency. (Grissmer & Kirby, Changing Patterns of Nonprior Service Attrition in the 
Army National Guard and Army Reserve, 1988) 
Kirby and Grissmer (1993) readdress previous studies and include the two year 
NPS attrition of the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve and the Marine Corps 
Reserve along with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.  They expanded the 
analysis to include cohorts from FY 1982–1988.  The study acknowledges that attrition to 
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the active component or the selected reserves maintains a return on investment so only 
the attrition to the civilian sector is looked upon negatively.  The five-year attrition rates 
were determined to be highest for the Marine Corps and lowest for the Air Force Reserve 
and Air National Guard.  These differences are believed to be a function of the inherent, 
unmeasured characteristics of the components themselves or the types of individuals they 
attract.  When comparing the reserve attrition to the active component for both one year 
and four years of service, the attrition is comparable.  In addition, attrition has seen a 
decline as each cohort progresses.  This is hypothesized to be the result of an increased 
quality of recruits, the introduction of the Montgomery G.I. Bill in 1984, investment of 
substantial resources, and improving equipment and training. (Kirby & Grissmer, 1993)  
Wenger and Hodari (2004) explored non-cognitive factors affecting active 
component (AC) attrition.  Using educational and survey data on active duty recruits of 
all services, they found recruits who enlist at age 17 have higher attrition than those who 
enlist at 18.  In addition, those who have ever been expelled from school have higher 
attrition rates than those who have never been expelled. If students indicated that they 
had considered dropping out of school but in fact did complete and earn a High School 
diploma, they were more likely to attrite than those who had never considered dropping 
out.  The study also showed that individuals who attained a certificate of completion or 
attendance had equivalent attrition rates as those who earned a High School diploma.  
This suggests those with a certificate of completion or attendance may be a good source 
for recruiters despite the lack of a High School diploma due to characteristics of 
persistence or determination.  Smokers were also found to attrite more than non-smokers 
revealing a potential deviant behavioral pattern. (Wenger & Hodari, Predictors of 
Attrition: Attitudes, Behaviors, and Educational Characteristics, 2004) 
Wenger and Hodari (2004) also analyzed whether Home Schooled recruits and 
recruits with a GED who participated in the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe Program 
should be classified as Tier 1 applicants.  They compared the homeschooled and 
ChalleNGe program recruits with other High School graduate recruits treating them all as 
Tier-1 eligible.  The results show that both the home schooled recruits and the 
participants of the ChalleNGe program have much higher attrition rates than the high 
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school diploma recruits.  The ultimate recommendations from the study were to not 
classify home schooled or ChalleNGe program participants as Tier-1 recruits because 
they are far less likely than traditional high school graduates to complete an initial 
obligation. (Wenger & Hodari, Final Analysis of Evaluation of Homeschool and 
ChalleNGe Program Recruits, 2004) 
Wenger (2010) recognizes that the relationship between education credentials and 
first-term attrition rates in the active military is well established.  However, those without 
high school diplomas have fairly high levels of cognitive skills but continue to have 
higher attrition rates than those with high school diplomas.  The Army Research Institute 
developed a non-cognitive screen to test attributes of motivation or timeliness called the 
Assessment of Individual Motivation (AIM).  The study showed minor correlations with 
low scores on the AIM screening to increased attrition, but may be a helpful tool 
especially when selecting GED holders. (Wenger, Expanding the Recruiting Market: 
Noncognitive Testing, 2010) 
Hattiangadi and Parcell (2006) examined the Selected Reserve Attrition of the 
Marine Corps and focused on incentives to minimize attrition.  The study looked at both 
NPS and prior service (PS) Marines but found because the NPS Marines already incurred 
a 6-year obligation to serve, bonuses and other measures decreased attrition slightly but 
made more of an impact on the PS Marines.  The Marine Corps invests very little 
resources into the Selected Reserve Incentive Program but may need to reconsider as the 
Army Reserve and National Guard attract more PS Marines with enticing recruiting 
packages. (Hattiangadi & Parcell, 2006) 
Dolfini-Reed et al (2005) assessed the impact of mobilization, activation, and 
deployment on losses for the SelRes of all services from September 2001 through 
January 2005 and compared them to losses for the SelRes in 2000.  The member was 
considered a loss if no longer serving with the SelRes within six months of being 
deactivated.  The study examined all enlisted SelRes (non-prior and prior service), but 
did not take into account those members who were still activated since they did not have 
the opportunity to leave while activated.  The results across all the SelRes services 
showed higher losses than the FY 2000 comparison group and higher losses for those 
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who were activated but not deployed compared to those who were activated and 
deployed.  Losses also tend to increase for those who were activated for longer periods.  
Those who were never activated had an increase of losses over the FY 2000 cohort and 
have tracked somewhat closely with those who were recently deactivated but are slightly 
higher than those who were activated and deployed. (Dolfini-Reed, Parcell, Gregory, & 
Horne, 2005) 
B. SUMMARY 
This thesis will address much of the same characteristics in the previous studies 
such as gender, race, marital status, education, performance, geographical area, and 
unemployment to determine possible attrition factors.  Because September 11, 2001 was 
such an impactful event to most Americans, this thesis will examine if attrition of NPS 
reservists with a 6X2 contract in the USMCR has changed due to 9/11.  In addition, 
attrition will be analyzed to evaluate the impact of reservists being mobilized and 
deployed in great numbers to different regions throughout the world.  Lastly, this thesis 
will explore the impact on attrition depending on the unit composition; combat arms, 
aviation, or support.  By addressing the impact of momentous events such as 9/11 and 
unprecedented levels of deployment, it can be determined if such events have a positive 
or negative impact on attrition so leadership can have better information in order to plan 
for the future.  If one area of the Marine Corps reserve has less attrition than another, 
leadership will have the ability to target certain populations to lessen the impact of 
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III. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
This chapter presents a list and description of the variables used in this thesis.  
The data for this thesis was provided by Marine Corps Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans, 
Policy, and Programming (RAP); collected from the Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW), Marine Corps Recruiting Information Support System (MCRISS), and the 
Bureau of Labor and Statistics.  The data from the three sources was merged together by 
using unique, encrypted social security numbers, while maintaining sequential monthly 
data throughout a reservist’s tenure.  In this way, a perfect match of the person to a 
specific time could be accomplished to reference the applicable data.  The unemployment 
rate data was merged using the same monthly sequential data and the reservist’s home of 
record to match the time and place with the corresponding unemployment rate.   
Table 2 in Section A lists the variables divided into category, variable name, 
variable description, and definition.  The categories are divided into the Dependent 
variable (attrition) and Independent variables, which are subdivided into sub-categories: 
deployment, demographics, military demographics, and enlistment characteristics.  
Variable Name, Variable Description, and Definition further explain the different 
variables.  Sections B and C give more detail on each variable for further clarification 
A. LIST OF VARIABLES 
Table 2.   Overview of Each Variable 
Category Variable Name Variable Description Definition 
DEPENDENT    
Attrition attrite Individual attrited from the unit  1=attrited 
0=retained 
INDEPENDENT    
Deployment afg_deployment Deployed to Afghanistan at least once 1=deployed 
0=otherwise 
 afg_freq Number of times deployed to 
Afghanistan 
Min = 0 
Max = 3 
 afg_total Number of months deployed to 
Afghanistan 
Min = 0 
Max = 21 
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 iraq_deployment Deployed to Iraq at least once 1=deployed 
0=otherwise 
 iraq_freq Number of times deployed to Iraq Min = 0 
Max = 4 
 iraq_total Number of months deployed to Iraq Min = 0 
Max = 24 
 oconus_deployment Deployed OCONUS at least once 1=deployed 
0=otherwise 
 oconus_freq Number of times deployed OCONUS Min = 0 
Max = 4 
 oconus_total Number of months deployed OCONUS Min = 0 
Max = 52 




 hfp_freq Number of times deployed to a hostile 
fire pay area 
Min = 0 
Max = 4 
 hfp_total Number of months deployed to a hostile 
fire pay area 
Min = 0 
Max = 24 
 mobilized Mobilized at least once 1=mobilized 
0=otherwise 
 mob_freq Number of times mobilized Min = 0 
Max = 4 
 mob_total Number of months mobilized Min = 0 
Max = 53 
Demographics age Age in years at enlistment Min = 17.25 
Max = 42.25 
 female Gender 1=female 
0=male 
 single Single 1=single 
0=otherwise 
 married Married 1=married 
0=otherwise 
 divorced Divorced 1=divorced 
0=otherwise 
 depn_1plus Service member supports at least one 
dependent 




 depn Number of dependents Min = 0 
Max = 8 
 white Gender is Caucasian 1=white 
0=otherwise 
 black Gender is African American 1=black 
0=otherwise 
 asian Gender is Asian 1=Asian 
0=otherwise 
 other Gender is not Caucasian, African 
American or Asian 
1=Other 
0=otherwise 
Military Demographics combat_arms MOS is infantry, artillery or tanks 1=combat arms 
0=otherwise 
 aviation MOS is aviation related 1=aviation 
0=otherwise 
 support MOS is support related 1=support 
0=otherwise 
 pro_con Average proficiency /conduct score in 
service (converted) 
Min = 0 
Max = 10 
 pro_con_poor Service members pro/cons average was 
less than 4.0 out of 5 
1=poor pro/con 
0=otherwise 
 pft_score Physical fitness test score converted Min=0 
Max=5.0 
 pft1 Physical fitness test score is First Class 1=1st class pft 
0=otherwise 
 pft2 Physical fitness test score is Second 
Class 
1=2nd class pft 
0=otherwise 




dep_time Delayed entry program in days Min=0 
Max =365 
 afqt Armed Forces Qualification Test score Min=21 
Max=99 
 afqt_high_quality AFQT score ≥50 1=High quality  
0=otherwise 
 afqt_low_quality AFQT score ≤49 1=Low quality 
0=otherwise 
 hs_dg High School Diploma 1=HS Diploma 
0=otherwise 
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 hs_alt Alternate HS Diploma (GED etc.) 1=Alt HS dip 
0=otherwise 
 college_degree Any college degree (AA , BA, PhD, etc) 1=college deg 
0=otherwise 




 ma Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA) 1=middle 
atlantic 
0=otherwise 
 sa South Atlantic (FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, 
WV, DC, MD, DE) 
1=south atlantic 
0=otherwise 
 se East South Central (KY, TN, MS, AL) 1=east south 
central 
0=otherwise 
 sec West South Central (OK, AR, TX, LA) 1=west south 
central 
0=otherwise 
 midwe East North Central (IL, IN, MI, WI, OH) 1= east north 
central 
0=otherwise 
 midww West North Central (MO, ND, NE, KS, 








 wp Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA, AK) 1=pacific 
0=otherwise 
 unemp_rate Individuals state unemployment rate Min=2.1 
Max=16.9 









 overlap_911 Individuals who enlisted before 9/11 but 
their contract ended after 9/11 
1=Overlap-9/11 
0=otherwise 
 post_911 Individuals enlisted after 9/11 1=Post-9/11 
0=otherwise 
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B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
1. Attrition 
The dependent variable is attrite which indicates whether the reservist remained 
with their drilling unit (attrite = 0) or if they no longer are drilling with their unit (attrite = 
1).   By creating the panel data and examining the last entry it can be determined whether 
a member was an attrite during the first 6 years of obligated service or if they remained to 
fulfill their 6-year commitment. 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. Mobilized and/or Deployed 
Mobilization is a disruption in a reservist’s life.  Many reservists have full time 
jobs in the civilian sector or go to college full- or part-time.  Being mobilized puts a 
reservist’s civilian life on hold for a year or more while they are focused on honoring 
their Marine Corps commitment and duty.  Mobilized reservists may find themselves 
spending some or all their time in a myriad of locations to include their home base or 
other Continental United States (CONUS) locations, or Outside of the Continental U.S 
(OCONUS) in a friendly location such as Japan, or in hostile fire pay (HFP) areas such as 
Iraq or Afghanistan.  Because the location of a mobilization may affect an individual’s 
perception of quality of life, the mobilization related variables examine the location and 
the duration of mobilizations. 
a. Mobilized 
 Three variables are used to measure mobilization.  The first variable, 
mobilized, is binary and measures whether an individual has ever been mobilized.  
Another variable, mob_freq, determines how many times an individual has been 
mobilized.  The other variable, mob_total, measures how many months an individual has 
been mobilized during their first tour. 
b. Hostile Fire Pay Deployment 
 Where an individual is deployed may impact their behavior.  A hostile fire 
pay (HFP) area is determined by the Department of Defense (DoD) as an area that may 
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be dangerous and where individuals receive imminent danger pay (also known as combat 
pay).  Examples of HFP areas include Iraq, Afghanistan, numerous countries throughout 
the Middle East, and also some seas such as the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.  The variable, 
hfp_deployment, is binary measuring whether an individual has ever been deployed to a 
HFP area.  Another variable, hfp_freq, measures the number of separate HFP 
deployments.  To measure the number of months deployed in a HFP area, the variable 
hfp_total is used. 
c. Afghanistan 
 A major area of combat operations where Marine Reservists are often 
deployed is Afghanistan.  By separating Afghanistan from other deployments, it may be 
possible to explain if specific areas impact deployed reservists’ behavior.  A binary 
variable, afg_deployment, measures whether an individual has ever been to Afghanistan.  
Another variable, afg_freq, measures how many times an individual has been deployed to 
Afghanistan.  A final variable, afg_total, measures how many months an individual has 
spent in Afghanistan. 
d. Iraq 
 Another major area of combat operations where Marine Reservists were 
often deployed is Iraq.  Like the other variables in this section, iraq_deployment is binary 
measuring whether an individual has ever been deployed to Iraq.  The frequency of 
deployments to Iraq is defined by the iraq_freq variable.  Lastly, the number of months 
of service deployed to Iraq is measured with the iraq_total variable.   
e. OCONUS 
 Lastly, individuals were analyzed if they were deployed anywhere outside 
the continental United States.  These variables include HFP areas as well as “friendly” 
areas such as Japan or Australia, to name a few.  In line with the other variables in this 
section, oconus_deployment is a binary variable measuring whether an individual has 
ever been deployed OCONUS.   
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The number of OCONUS deployments is measured using the oconus_freq variable.  
Lastly, the variable oconus_total measures the number of months deployed OCONUS. 
2. Individual Characteristic Demographics 
Individual demographic characteristics are used in this analysis as predictors of 
attrition.  This thesis will include gender, race, marital status, and number of dependents 
to determine if any of these factors have an impact on an individual’s probability of 
leaving the USMCR early.  
a. Gender 
 A binary variable female is included to capture the effect of gender.  In 
previous military manpower studies, females have been found to be more likely to attrite.   
The current trend in the DoD is to allow females to perform in previously restricted 
military occupational specialties (MOS) such as combat pilots.  Current discussions are 
being conducted on allowing females to be assigned to ground combat MOS’s such as 
infantry.  By continuing to study gender related attrition, policy makers and planners can  
make better decisions. 
b. Race/Ethnicity 
 In this data set, the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) raw data 
provided six main racial/ethnic categories: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, 
Black or African American, native Hawaiian or other Pacific Island, White, and Declined 
to Respond.  Because the American Indian/Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Island categories comprised of less than one percent of the population, they were 
combined with the Declined to Respond to form the other variable.  Approximately 12 
percent of the reservists did not provide any race information and thus were also placed 
in the other variable.  The remaining variables for race are white, black, and asian.  
Hispanics are believed to be absorbed into a mix of the White and Other categories.   
 22 
c. Age 
 Age is another demographic that is commonly used as a predictor in 
military attrition studies.  For this thesis, the variable age is used to represent the age of 
the individual on their Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD). This will show the maturity of the 
individual when they started their enlistment.   
d. Marital Status 
 Marital status is often used in military attrition studies to determine if 
relational influences have any impact.  The variables single, married, and divorced are 
used to indicate an individual’s current relationship status. 
e. Dependents 
 Dependents may include a spouse, children, care for an elderly family 
member or legal guardian of a relative.  This thesis examines two variables related to 
dependents.  If a reservist has at least one dependent, the variable depn_1plus = 1.  The 
variable to indicate the number of dependents is depn.  Only one of these variables should 
be regressed at one time to prevent co-linearity. 
3. Military Demographics 
All Marines are assigned a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in which they 
are trained to perform a specific job and duties.  The Marine Corps characterizes the job 
specialties into three main categories: Combat Arms, Aviation, and Support.  The specific 
category an individual belongs to may impact attrition due to organizational culture, job 
environment, or other factors.  In addition Marines performance is best measured by their 
Proficiency and Conduct (pro/con) marks and their Physical Fitness Test (PFT) scores.  
High pro/con and PFT scores are indicative of good performance and may correlate with 
lower attrition due to positive reinforcement of individual success. 
a. Marine Corps Job Areas 
 Marines are categorized into 1 of 3 job areas depending on their MOS.  
Combat Arms consists of the infantry, tanks, and artillery.  Aviation comprises with any 
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job related to flying, maintaining or supporting airplanes.  Support MOS’s are all the rest 
which provide other crucial services to the other areas.  Examples of a support MOS 
include, Administration, Intelligence, Supply, Logistics, etc.  By categorizing the 
individuals into Combat Arms, Aviation, and Support, attrition differences by community 
can be analyzed. 
b. Proficiency and Conduct Marks 
 Marines in the rank of Private thru Corporal (E-1–E-4) are evaluated using 
Proficiency and Conduct marks.  The evaluations are an indication of the individual’s 
performance and character.  Scores are evaluated using a 5-point scale from 0–5.  Scores 
from 0–3.9 are described as “Unacceptable” to “Below Average” and are considered 
unfavorable.  Scores from 4.0–4.4 are considered “Average”.   “Excellent” scores are 
from 4.5–4.8 and “Outstanding” scores include 4.9–5.0.  The variable pro_con_poor 
identifies below-average individuals who scored less than a 4.0 on either the pro or con 
score indicating poor performance.  The variable pro_con is an average of the pro/con 
marks transformed into a 10-point scale.  For individuals who score a 4.2/4.4, the average 
pro/con is 4.3 so the pro_con score is a 3.  Individuals with 4.0 or lower score a 0.  Only 
one of these variables should be regressed at one time to prevent co-linearity. 
c. Physical Fitness Test Score 
 The Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test (PFT) is another indicator of 
performance. Marines perform the PFT at least once a year and score from 0-300 points.  
Three events include pull-ups, crunches, and a 3-mile run each scoring a possible 100 
points.   The three events scores are combined to give the individual’s final score.  The 
PFT scores are also categorized into three categories.  For Marines aged 17–26, a First 
Class PFT is between 225–300 points, a Second Class PFT is from 175–224 points, and a 
Third Class PFT is from 135–174.  The pft_score variable was created using Table 3 in 
order to convert the PFT score to the same scale as the pro/con variable. 
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Table 3.   PFT Conversion Chart (From MCO P1400.32D) 
 
4. Enlistment Characteristics 
 Enlistment Characteristics consist of the reservist’s demographics when they were 
enlisted in the reserves.  In this thesis, the following characteristics will be examined:  
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, the home area of the reservist and its 
corresponding unemployment rate, the highest level of education, and the year the 
reservist joined the USMCR.  These variables can all predict attrition behavior.   
a. Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
  The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score is a standardized test 
given to every military enlistee to test for aptitude and ability.  The scores range from 0–
99.  In addition to the raw score, the AFQT was divided into two categories, “high 
performers” (scored ≥50) and “low performers” (scored ≤49) in order to demonstrate any 
differences in the attrition of these groups.  Only one of these variables should be 
regressed at one time to prevent co-linearity.  
b. Education 
  An individual’s education level is another important variable to examine 
in attrition models.  Individuals with a high school diploma (HSD) have traditionally 
 25 
been more successful than those without a HSD.  This thesis has created three variables: 
High School Diploma, Alternate High School Diploma, and College Degree to define 
education level of the reservists.  In other studies involving attrition, those with an 
alternative to the traditional HSD tend to attrite at a higher rate than others who have 
completed high school. 
c. Geographic Area 
  Most 6X2 NPS reservists enlist and join a unit close their hometowns.  
Different geographic regions throughout the U.S. may display different attrition 
behaviors.  This thesis divided the U.S. into 9 geographic regions to be in line with the 
U.S. census designations.  The regions include: New England, Middle Atlantic, South 
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, East North Central, West North 




Figure 4.   Census Regions and Division in the United States (From Census Bureau’s 
Geographic Areas Reference Manual, 1994) 
d. Unemployment Rate 
The unemployment rate may also be a factor that affects the attrition 
behavior of an individual.  Because every state has a different unemployment rate at 
different times throughout the period, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics was 
collected to match each individual with the corresponding unemployment rate.  The data 
was collected to show the monthly unemployment rate for every state from FY 1994 
through 2011.   
e. Cohort 
The population was divided into cohorts based on the fiscal year of the 
individual’s (PEBD).  Nineteen different cohorts from FY 1994 thru FY 2011 were 
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created.  It is possible that major events such as September, 11 2001 or periods of high 
mobilization and deployments may have affected individuals’ attrition behavior. 
f. September 11, 2001– Pre, Overlap, and Post Contracts 
The terrorist attacks on the American homeland on September 11, 2001 
(9/11) changed the way Americans viewed their security.  A brand new cabinet 
department of the federal government, The Department of Homeland Security was 
created in response to the attacks on 9/11 to protect the U.S. from further attacks and 
provide support in case of an attack, a man-made accident or a natural disaster.  The way 
Americans felt about protecting the homeland was very different after 9/11 than before.  
In this thesis, three variables were created to delineate the population of reservists who 
completed their 6X2 contract prior to the 9/11 attacks, those whose contract overlapped 
9/11, and those who enlisted after 9/11.  By comparing the three variables, we can assess 
the impact of 9/11 on individuals behavior related to attrition. 
D. SUMMARY 
 This chapter provided a list and the description of the variables in this thesis.  The 
dependent variable is attrite, which measures whether an individual has retained, attrite = 
0, or is no longer with the unit, attrite = 1.  The independent variables to examine 
retention/attrition characteristics include deployment and mobilization characteristics 
including where individuals were mobilized, how many times, and for how long.  
Personal demographics such as age, gender, marital status, characteristics related to 
dependents/children, and race is also included.  In addition, military demographics 
including the type of Marine Corps job (combat arms, aviation, or support), and 
individual performance characteristics determined by pro/con marks and PFT scores are 





They include reservists AFQT scores, their highest level of education (GED, HSD, 
college, etc.), the area of the country the individual is from and its corresponding 
unemployment rate, the FY cohort the individual belongs to calculated by his/her PEBD, 
and the individuals enlistment contract in relation to 9/11 (Pre, Overlap, or Post).   By 
examining these factors, we will have a better understanding of the characteristics of 
those who are more likely to attrite. 
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IV DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PRELIMINARY DATA 
ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present descriptive statistics and preliminary 
analysis of the NPS reservist data for the years FY 1994 through FY 2011.  The data is 
discussed for the entire sample and for three sub-samples covering three time periods: 
Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11.  Because September 11, 2001 was such a 
monumental event, the samples differ depending on when the individual served relative 
to 9/11.  The Pre-9/11 sample consists of reservists who enlisted in FY 1994 and FY 
1995, and whose initial six-year obligation expired prior to the events of September 11, 
2001 (namely in the years 2000–2001).  The Overlap-9/11 sample consists of reservists 
who enlisted between FY 1996 and 2001.  These individuals all enlisted prior to 9/11 but 
their 6-year service obligation did not expire until after 9/11 (namely in the period 2002–
2007).  The Post-9/11 sample contains individuals who enlisted between FY 2002 and 
2005 after 9/11 but who completed their six-year obligation prior to September 30, 2011, 
the last period for which data is available.  Thus, these reservists completed their 
obligations during the period from 2008 to 2011. 
The data was collected as panel data with over 3.5 million observations consisting 
of multiple monthly observations for the same individual.  This would allow for up to 72 
observations for an individual who served the entire six-year commitment.  Because we 
are not interested in 72 observations on the same individual, the data is analyzed using 
only the last observation of each individual.  By using only one observation for each 
individual, a more accurate picture of the demographics of the population can be 
represented.  For example, if females consistently complete their six-year obligation, each 
female reservist would have 72 observations per person.  Likewise, if males attrite early 
in their contract, there would be considerably fewer observations per male collectively 
and thus give an inaccurate portrayal of the demographics of the sample indicating a 
higher retention rate for females. 
The data is analyzed using two models.  The first model uses restricted data which 
includes only those reservists who actually deployed OCONUS at least once.  Individuals 
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who deployed OCONUS are very similar to each other whether they attrited or completed 
their six-year obligation because they had similar experiences and remained with the 
reserves for a significant period (at least long enough for one deployment).  Individuals 
who did not deploy OCONUS or attrited early in their reserve commitment are inherently 
different from those who remain.  By limiting the sample to only those who deployed 
OCONUS, we minimize bias and get a more accurate picture of the effect of deployment 
on attrition.  The drawback to restricting the model to only those who deployed 
OCONUS is, we lose information on the Pre-9/11 cohort because only 0.3 percent 
deployed OCONUS and cannot be accurately analyzed.  Because of this, we analyze a 
second model of the entire unrestricted sample to observe characteristics of the Pre-9/11 
cohort in order to compare with those who served after 9/11.  
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE AND THREE 
SUB-SAMPLES WHO DEPLOYED OCONUS (FY 1994–2005) 
The data in column 1 of Table 4 represents NPS 6X2 contract reservists who 
deployed at least once OCONUS.  These reservists enlisted during FY 1994–2005 and 
thus had the opportunity to complete their 6-year enlistment before the last observation in 
the data set, October 31, 2011.  There is insufficient time to observe a full six-year 
contract period for individuals who enlisted in FY 2006–2011.  By removing those who 
enlisted in FY 2006–2011, bias is eliminated because those individuals would have only 
been observed for five years or less. 
Columns 1–4 of Table 4 show the four analysis samples of reservists who 
deployed OCONUS:  (1) The full sample for FY 1994–2005;  (2) The Pre-9/11 group that 
enlisted in FY 1994 and 1995 and completed their 6-year commitment prior to 9/11;  (3) 
The Overlap-9/11 group that enlisted prior to 9/11 during FY 1996–2001 but whose six-
year contracts expired sometime after 9/11;  and (4) The Post-9/11 group that enlisted 




Table 4.   Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample and Three Sub-Samples (FY 1994‒
2005) of reservists who deployed OCONUS 
Variable (1) Full Analysis Sample  
1994-2005 
(2) Pre-9/11 Sample 
 1994-1995  
(3) Overlap-9/11 Sample  
1996-2001 
(4) Post-9/11 Sample 
 2002-2005  
attrite .117 .3103 .0787 .1429 
 (.3214) (.4708) (.2693) (.3499) 
gender (female = 1) .023 0 .0208 .0246 
 (.1499) (0) (.1427) (.1549) 
age at enlistment 19.9227 20.0882 19.8526 19.9705 
 (2.284) (2.425) (2.2821) (2.2839) 
Single (=1) .6819 .6552 .6785 .6844 
 (.4657) (.4837) (.4671) (.4648) 
Married (=1) .2981 .2759 .3043 .2939 
 (.4574) (.4549) (.4601) (.4556) 
Divorce (=1) .0199 .069 .0172 .0217 
 (.1398) (.2579) (.1299) (.1458) 
at least one dependent 
(=1) 
.3358 .3448 .3498 .3261 
 (.4723) (.4837) (.4769) (.4688) 
# of dependents .5502 .931 .5725 .534 
 (.9355) (1.6676) (.9511) (.922) 
White = 1 .7534 .7241 .7381 .7641 
 (.431) (.4549) (.4397) (.4246) 
African American =1 .0719 .069 .0897 .0597 
 (.2583) (.2579) (.2857) (.2369) 
Asian = 1 .0385 .069 .0401 .0373 
 (.1923) (.2579) (.1962) (.1894) 
Pacific Is, Am Indian 
or no response 
.1362 .1379 .1321 .139 
 (.343) (.3509) (.3387) (.3459) 
1994 Cohort .0006 .4828   
 (.0254) (.5085)   
1995 Cohort .0007 .5172   
 (.0263) (.5085)   
1996 Cohort .0009  .0023  
 (.0303)  (.0475)  
1997 Cohort .0052  .0126  
 (.0716)  (.1118)  
1998 Cohort .0549  .1349  
 (.2279)  (.3416)  
1999 Cohort .0794  .1948  
 (.2703)  (.3961)  
2000 Cohort .1246  .3059  
 (.3303)  (.4608)  
2001 Cohort .1424  .3496  
 (.3495)  (.4769)  
2002 Cohort .1539   .2602 
 (.3608)   (.4388) 
2003 Cohort .1471   .2488 
 (.3542)   (.4324) 
2004 Cohort .1522   .2575 
 (.3593)   (.4373) 
2005 Cohort .1381   .2335 
 (.345)   (.4231) 
expectation not to 
deploy (Pre-9/11) 
.0013 1 0 0 
 (.0365) (0) (0) (0) 
expectation changed 
due to 9/11 (overlap) 
.4074 0 1 0 
 (.4914) (0) (0) (0) 
expectation to deploy 
(Post-9/11) 
.5913 0 0 1 
 (.4916) (0) (0) (0) 
Combat arms MOS .3749 .3448 .3742 .3754 
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Variable (1) Full Analysis Sample  
1994-2005 
(2) Pre-9/11 Sample 
 1994-1995  
(3) Overlap-9/11 Sample  
1996-2001 
(4) Post-9/11 Sample 
 2002-2005  
 (.4841) (.4837) (.4839) (.4843) 
Aviation MOS .0496 .069 .0542 .0465 
 (.2172) (.2579) (.2264) (.2105) 
Support MOS .5755 .5862 .5716 .5781 
 (.4943) (.5012) (.4949) (.4939) 
AFQT Score 66.9309 72.9259 66.9008 66.9389 
 (18.7899) (17.389) (18.7191) (18.8408) 
Low quality AFQT 
(Score 21 to 49) 
.2074 .0741 .2055 .2089 
 (.4054) (.2669) (.4041) (.4066) 
High quality AFQT 
(score >=50)  
.7926 .9259 .7945 .7911 
 (.4054) (.2669) (.4041) (.4066) 
Aggregate Pro/Cons 
using a 10.0 scale  
4.3329 4.931 4.5197 4.2028 
 (1.3406) (1.9073) (1.4069) (1.2752) 
PFT score 44.6658 44.6818 44.2001 45.0202 
 (3.75) (3.1681) (3.8957) (3.5965) 
1st Class PFT .5614 .6207 .4887 .6113 
 (.4962) (.4938) (.4999) (.4875) 
2nd Class PFT .2903 .2414 .3305 .2627 
 (.4539) (.4355) (.4704) (.4401) 
3rd Class PFT .0667 .0345 .0925 .049 
 (.2495) (.1857) (.2897) (.2159) 
Other PFT .0806 .1034 .087 .0762 
 (.2722) (.3099) (.2818) (.2653) 
High School Diploma .906 .8148 .9121 .9014 
 (.2919) (.3958) (.2832) (.2982) 
Alt HS Diploma 
(GED, homeschool) 
.037 .0741 .029 .0433 
 (.1888) (.2669) (.1679) (.2034) 
Any college degree .0569 .1111 .0589 .0552 
 (.2316) (.3203) (.2354) (.2284) 
education code 
missing 
.0805 .069 .0044 .1329 
 (.272) (.2579) (.0662) (.3395) 
State unemployment 
rate  
6.4586 4.4577 5.1424 7.3705 
 (2.4055) (.9675) (1.0545) (2.6431) 
IL, IN, MI, WI, OH .154 0 .1503 .1569 
 (.361) (0) (.3574) (.3637) 
MO, ND, NE, KS, 
SD, MN, IA 
.0447 .0385 .0343 .0518 
 (.2066) (.1961) (.182) (.2217) 
CT, MA, ME, NH, 
RI, VT 
.061 0 .0527 .0669 
 (.2394) (0) (.2235) (.2498) 
NJ, NY, PA .1481 .1538 .1594 .1403 
 (.3552) (.3679) (.366) (.3474) 
FL,GA,SC, NC, VA, 
WV, DC, MD, DE 
.1781 .3077 .1808 .1759 
 (.3826) (.4707) (.3848) (.3808) 
KY, TN, MS, AL .0675 .0385 .0694 .0663 
 (.251) (.1961) (.2541) (.2489) 
OK, AR, TX, LA .1274 .1538 .1296 .1259 
 (.3335) (.3679) (.3359) (.3317) 
AZ, NM, NV, UT, 
ID, CO, MT, WY 
.0569 .1154 .0646 .0514 
 (.2316) (.3258) (.2459) (.2209) 
CA, HI, OR, WA, 
AK 
.1622 .1923 .1589 .1645 
 (.3687) (.4019) (.3656) (.3707) 
Mobilized at Least 
Once 
.9959 .3448 .9947 .9982 
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Variable (1) Full Analysis Sample  
1994-2005 
(2) Pre-9/11 Sample 
 1994-1995  
(3) Overlap-9/11 Sample  
1996-2001 
(4) Post-9/11 Sample 
 2002-2005  
 (.0639) (.4837) (.0727) (.0423) 
Number of separate 
mobilizations 
1.2421 .3793 1.2098 1.2663 
 (.4614) (.5615) (.4328) (.4768) 
Total months 
previously mobilized 
13.0068 3.8966 11.584 14.0075 
 (6.0118) (6.1606) (5.893) (5.8766) 
Deployed OCONUS 
at Least Once 
1 1 1 1 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Number of separate 
OCONUS deploys 
1.1911 1.069 1.1493 1.2201 
 (.4181) (.2579) (.3759) (.4428) 
Total months 
previously OCONUS 
7.2676 8.5517 6.5915 7.7305 
 (5.4515) (5.7915) (5.6781) (5.2389) 
Deployed to a HFP 
zone at least once 
.9726 .3793 .9471 .9914 
 (.1633) (.4938) (.2238) (.0921) 
Number of separate 
HFP deployments 
1.1454 .4138 1.0696 1.1993 
 (.4414) (.568) (.4221) (.445) 
Total months  in HFP 
zone 
6.2677 2.6552 5.1249 7.0632 
 (3.1142) (3.7443) (2.9626) (2.9602) 
Deployed Iraq at 
Least Once 
.6522 .2414 .3967 .8292 
 (.4763) (.4355) (.4892) (.3763) 
Number of separate 
Iraq deployments 
.7327 .2414 .4118 .9549 
 (.602) (.4355) (.5225) (.551) 
Total months 
previously Iraq 
4.4062 1.6207 2.4052 5.7909 
 (3.8014) (2.9449) (3.2429) (3.533) 
Deployed AFG at 
Least Once 
.0334 0 .016 .0454 
 (.1797) (0) (.1256) (.2083) 
Number of separate 
AFG deployments 
.0349 0 .0171 .0472 
 (.1913) (0) (.1371) (.2204) 
Total months 
previously AFG 
.1804 0 .1073 .2312 
 (1.0916) (0) (.9267) (1.1905) 
Observations 21735 29 8854 12852 
Standard deviations 
in parentheses 
    
1. Descriptive Statistics for the Full 1994–2005 Sample 
Column 1 of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of NPS 6X2 
USMCR enlistees for 1994–2005 who deployed at least once OCONUS.  The panel data 
was compressed to obtain 21,735 individuals who are observed on their last date in the 
USMCR.  A total attrition rate of 11.7 percent was observed for all individuals.  Women 
comprise 2.3 percent of the sample and African Americans are 7.2 percent.  The majority 
(57.6 percent) of the sample had a support MOS, while 37.5 percent had a Combat Arms 
MOS.  For the full sample overall, 65.2 percent of the reservists were deployed at least 
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once to Iraq, 3.3 percent were deployed at least once to Afghanistan, and 97.3 percent 
were deployed at least once to a hostile fire pay (HFP) area.   
2. Descriptive Statistics for the Pre-9/11 Sample (1994–1995 Cohorts) 
Column 2 of Table 4 represents the population of NPS reservists with a 6X2 
contract who enlisted in FY 1994 or 1995 and deployed OCONUS at least once.  This 
group is unique from the other cohorts because they had the opportunity to complete their 
6-year commitment prior to the events of 9/11.  The sample contains only 29 individuals 
because very few reservists were mobilized or deployed prior to 9/11.  Support MOS 
marines comprised 57.6 percent of the sample and Combat Arms MOS marines 
represented 34.5 percent.  Interestingly, 92.6 percent of this group had a high quality 
AFQT score (≥50) and the average PRO/CON score was a 4.9 indicating although a 
small number, predominantly only those with proven ability were deployed OCONUS 
during this period.  This is contrasting to the average for the entire period (1994-2005) of 
79.3 percent for High Quality AFQT and 4.3 for Pro/Con scores.  Because the sample is 
so small (29 observations) an accurate analysis of this group compared to the other 
cohorts cannot be accomplished.  It is likely that the individuals in this cohort were 
chosen for an OCONUS deployment because they were top performers and thus were 
selected to attend a special exercise/operation overseas. 
3. Descriptive Statistics for the Overlap-9/11 Sample (1996–2001 
Cohorts) 
Column 3 of Table 4 represents the descriptive statistics of the Overlap-9/11 
sample.  During this period, 8,854 NPS reservists with a 6X2 contract deployed 
OCONUS at least once.  This cohort enlisted between FY 1996 and 2001.  All of their 
contracts terminated at some time after September 11, 2001.  This population is very 
similar to the Pre-9/11 population in that there was no expectation of mobilization or 
deployment when these individuals enlisted.  However, the events of 9/11 may have 
altered this population’s behavior with respect to attrition. 
The average attrition rate for the Overlap-9/11 population is 7.9 percent.  Females 
comprise of 2.5 percent of the sample and 9.0 percent is African American.  Support 
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MOS make up 57.2 percent of the sample and Combat Arms MOS comprises 37.4 
percent.  This group saw a large proportion (94.7 percent) deploying at least once to a 
HFP area, but most did not make it into Iraq or Afghanistan.  Only 39.7 deployed at least 
once to Iraq, and 1.6 percent to Afghanistan.  This would indicate that many probably 
spent their deployments in one of the Persian Gulf countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 
etc.) which helped support Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. 
4. Descriptive Statistics for the Post-9/11 Sample (2002–2005 Cohorts) 
Column 4 of Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the Post-9/11 sample 
whose members deployed at least once OCONUS.  The Post-9/11 population is unique in 
the fact that these NPS individuals enlisted in the USMCR with a 6X2 contract after 9/11 
occurred and President Bush had declared a war on terrorism. Combat operations began 
in Afghanistan in October of 2001 and in Iraq in March of 2003.  It is likely people who 
enlisted at this time would have had an expectation of being mobilized and deployed to 
help support the Global War on Terrorism.  This sample consists of 12,852 reservists who 
enlisted between FY 2002 and 2005 and deployed at least once OCONUS.  Reservists 
enlisting after FY 2005 were not included in this study because a full 6-year observation 
period could not be observed.  The average attrition rate for the Post-9/11 cohort was 
14.3 percent.  Females comprised 2.5 percent of the sample and African Americans made 
up 6.0 percent.  The ratio of Support to Combat Arms MOS remained consistent with the 
Overlap-9/11 cohort with 57.9 percent assigned a Support MOS and 37.5 percent a 
Combat Arms MOS.  Almost this entire group (99.1 percent) was deployed to a HFP 
area.  Iraq was the most popular destination with 82.9 percent of this group operating in 
Iraq. Although higher than the Overlap-9/11 group, only 4.7 percent of this group 
deployed to Afghanistan at least once. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE AND THREE 
SUB-SAMPLES UNRESTRICTED MODEL (FY 1994–2005) 
The previous section restricted the sample to only those who deployed OCONUS 
at least once.  Because reservists in the Pre-9/11 cohort rarely deployed, they cannot be 
accurately analyzed due to the limited observations available.   
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Because of this, the entire (unrestricted) sample is analyzed in this section to understand 
the characteristics between the cohorts. 
1. Attrition by Cohort 
Table 5 presents the average attrition rate for the entire population, regardless of 
deployment or not, for each entry cohort during FY 1994–2005.  As depicted, the average 
attrition rate of those who were in the Pre-9/11 cohort (1994–1995) was 36.1 percent, 
whereas the Overlap-9/11 (1996–2001) average attrition rate was 32.8 percent and the 
Post-9/11 (2002–2005) average attrition rate was 30.1 percent.   
Table 5.   Average Attrition Rates by Cohort (1994‒2005) 
Cohort Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 1994 4,933 .357 .479 
 1995 4,763 .366 .482 
 1996 5,038  .383 .486 
 1997 5,388   .362 .481 
 1998 5,193   .316 .465 
 1999 5,099   .309 .462 
 2000 5,448    .300 .458 
 2001 5,253   .298 .458 
 2002 5,090   .298 .458 
 2003 5,134    .305 .460 
 2004 5,317   .305 .460 
 2005 5,106  .297 .457 
 Pre-9/11 9,696   .361 .480 
 Overlap-9/11 31,419   .328 .469 
 Post-9/11 20,647   .301 .459 
Figure 5 best illustrates the average attrition for the mid-1990s cohorts near 36 
percent followed by a declining trend for later cohorts towards 30 percent. 
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Figure 5.   Average Attrition Rates for Cohorts (FY 1994–2005) 
2. Deployments by Cohort 
The likelihood of deploying for a reservist during this period really depended on 
when the reservist enlisted.  The Pre-9/11 cohort was very unlikely to deploy (0.3 
percent) whereas the Post-9/11 cohort had at least a 60 percent chance of deployment.  
Table 6 illustrates the percentage of reservists who deployed either to Afghanistan, Iraq, 
OCONUS, HFP area, or were mobilized.  When comparing deployment between Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the preponderance of reservists deployed to these countries went to Iraq.  
Only 2.8 percent of the Post-9/11 cohort deployed to Afghanistan, whereas 51.6 percent 
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Table 6.   Average Percentage Deployed to Each Area by Cohort 
Variable Total period 
(94-05) 






Deployed to Afg .0118 0 .0045 .0283 
Deployed to Iraq .2295 .0007 .1118 .5162 
Deployed OCONUS .3519 .0030 .2818 .6225 
Deployed to HFP area .3423 .0011 .2669 .6171 
Mobilized .4191 .0011 .3733 .6850  
Observations 61762 9696 31419 20647 
C. UNEMPLOYMENT BY COHORT 
Table 7 shows the average unemployment rate for each respective cohort from FY 
1994 to 2005.  The unemployment rates are derived from the home state of the 
individuals at the date when the individual was either an attrite or completed their 6-year 
commitment.  America experienced relatively comfortable unemployment rates prior to 
September 11, 2001 with an average unemployment in this sample of 4.5 percent.  After 
the events of 9/11, America’s unemployment rate increased.  The Post-9/11 sample 
experienced an average unemployment rate of 7.0 percent.  The hardest hit states were 
Puerto Rico, Nevada, Michigan, and California, which all had periods of unemployment 
greater than 12 percent.  The states with the lowest unemployment rates included 
Connecticut, Nebraska, Virginia, and Hawaii which enjoyed rates lower than 2.5 percent 










Table 7.   Average Unemployment rates by Cohort (1994‒2005) 
Cohort Obs         Mean         Std. Dev.        Min      Max 
1994 4,900     4.625     1.146         2.2        15.1 
1995 4,710     4.405  1.039       2.1        13.6 
1996 5,024     4.883     1.093         2.2        13.2 
1997 5,364     5.289  1.210         2.1        13.2 
1998 5,177     5.452   1.238         2.2        13.3 
1999 5,077     5.313    1.070         2.1        12.6 
2000 5,440     5.188   1.102         2.1        12.5 
2001 5,237    4.886  .996         2.3        12.1 
2002 5,084    4.951    .984 2.4        11.6 
2003 5,128     6.175       1.660       2.7        13.9 
2004 5,304     8.297  2.671 2.4        15.9 
2005 5,074    8.483   2.582         2.5        14.9 
Pre-9/11 9,610     4.517  1.100        2.1        15.1 
Overlap-9/11 31,319    5.170   1.142         2.1        13.3 
Post-9/11 20,590    6.988  2.567         2.4        15.9 
1994‒2005 61,519    5.676  1.993         2.1        15.9 
 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed descriptive statistics for the various samples of reservists.  
Three sub-samples were created to look at the characteristics of those in the sample: Pre-
9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11.  Two different groups of reservists were compiled.  
The first group consists of only those reservists who deployed OCONUS at least once.  
This will enable a comparison of individuals who are very similar in experiences and 
limit bias.  Unfortunately, the Pre-9/11 cohort has limited observations (only 29), and will 
not be able to be accurately analyzed with the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 cohorts.  The 
second group of reservists uses the unrestricted sample of all NPS reservists who enlisted 
with a 6X2 contract from 1994‒2005.  This will allow comparisons of the Pre-9/11 
cohort with the other cohorts but will restrict accurate analysis on the effects of 
deployments on attrition due to the fact that so few of the Pre-9/11 reservists deployed.  
From the statistics, it is apparent that attrition rates decreased from the mid-1990’s to the 
years after 9/11.  Mobilization and Deployment rates increased over the same period.  
Unemployment rates also changed significantly, increasing from the Pre-9/11 to Post-
9/11 period.  Most of the demographic variables remained fairly constant throughout the 
period and were consistent throughout the individual cohorts. 
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V. MULTIVARIATE DATA ANALYSIS 
This thesis evaluates the effects of multiple factors on attrition behavior of 
enlisted reservists.  Because attrition is a binary dependent variable, a probit model is 
used to calculate the effect of each specific factor on the probability of attrition.  The 
following equation is an example of a probit model:  
P(y = 1 | X) = Φ(a + b X) 
y is the dependent variable, attrition   
Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal random variable 
X are the independent variables (deployments, demographics, performance) 
By using a probit model, specific characteristics can be isolated to estimate the change in 
the probability of attrition due to a one-unit change in the specific factor holding all the 
other variables constant.   
In order to compare those who attrite with those who remain with their reserve 
unit for the duration of their six-year contract, this thesis uses two models.  The first 
model restricts the sample to analyze the NPS reservists who enlisted from 1996 to 2005 
with a 6X2 contract and who have deployed OCONUS at least once.  By comparing only 
those reservists who actually deployed, a more accurate analysis can be conducted to 
determine the effects of the type of deployment on attrition.  Bias is minimized by 
removing reservists who never deployed.  Individuals who attrited prior to an OCONUS 
deployment are very different than those who participated in an OCONUS deployment 
because they lack the experiences of a deployment and duration of being part of a reserve 
unit.  Regression models are estimated for three different samples of reservists: (1) The 
entire population of non-prior service (NPS) USMCR with a 6X2 contract who enlisted 
from FY 1996 through 2005 and who had at least one OCONUS deployment; (2) the 
Overlap-9/11 cohort, with at least one OCONUS deployment, which enlisted from FY 
1996 to 2001 prior to 9/11 but whose six-year contract expired after 9/11; and (3) the 
Post-9/11 cohort, with at least one OCONUS deployment, which enlisted after 9/11 from 
FY 2002 through 2005 and whose six-year contract expired prior to 31 October 2011.  
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The probit models analyze the effect of independent variables for deployment 
characteristics, demographics, performance characteristics, education, and geographic 
areas. 
Because the first model only includes the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 reservists, 
another model (unrestricted) is used to measure the effects of variables other than 
deployment on attrition for all three cohorts, Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11.  The 
unrestricted model is also a probit model and will be used to differentiate demographics, 
performance, education, and regional characteristics between the three cohorts. 
A. HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF THE VARIABLES ON ATTRITION 
 It is assumed that all of the independent variables will have some impact on the 
likelihood of whether a reservist will attrite or remain to fulfill their 6-year contract.  
Table 8 is a list of the hypothesized attrition effects of each variable.  The Pre-9/11 cohort 
is used as the base group to compare with the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 cohorts.  
Comparisons will be used to evaluate the effects of 9/11, mobilizations and deployments, 
and other personal characteristics.  The hypothesized results are depicted with a (+) if the 
variable is hypothesized to increase attrition and a (-) if the variable is hypothesized to 
decrease attrition.  These hypotheses are based on previous studies included in the 










Table 8.   Hypothesized Effects of Independent Variables on Attrition 
Category Explanatory Variable Pre 9/11 Overlap 9/11 Post 9/11 
Deployment Deployed to a HFP area at least once N/A + - 
 Deployed to Afghanistan at least once N/A + - 
 Deployed to Iraq at least once N/A + - 
Demographics Female + + + 
 Age + + + 
 At least one dependent + + + 
 Married + + + 
 Divorced - - - 
 African American - - - 
 Asian - - - 
 Other - - - 
Unit Type Aviation - - - 
 Support - - - 
Performance High Quality AFQT - - - 
 Proficiency/Conduct score - - - 
 College Degree - - - 
 Alt High School Degree (GED) + + + 
Geographic area Midwest (WI, MI, IL, IN, OH) + + + 
 West Midwest (ND, SD, NE, KS, MN, IA, MO) + + + 
 Mid Atlantic (NY, PA, NJ) + + + 
 South Atlantic (MD, DE, DC, WV, VA, NC, SC, 
GA, FL) 
+ + + 
 Southeast (KY, TN, MS, AL) + + + 
 SE Central (OK, TX, AR, LA) + + + 
 Mountain (MT, ID, WY, NV, UT, CO, AZ, NM) + + + 
 Pacific (CA, OR, WA, AK, HI) + + + 
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1. Hypothesized Relationships 
There is no hypothesized relationship between deployment and attrition for the 
Pre-9/11 cohort due to the fact that very few reservists during this period were ever 
mobilized or deployed.  There are a few reservists who may have deployed OCONUS 
either for Annual Training or other events and most likely enjoyed the experience of 
travel, which would possibly reduce attrition.  The Overlap-9/11 Cohort is expected to 
attrite at higher rates after deployments because they had no expectation of mobilization 
or deployment when they enlisted prior to 9/11.  The drastic change in one’s life due to a 
deployment is likely to increase attrition.  We hypothesize that the Post-9/11 cohort 
would have lower attrition due to deployments because they had an expectation of 
deployment when they enlisted knowing the country was at war.   
The demographic characteristics of individuals also may affect attrition.  Based on 
previous studies (see literature review in Chapter II), women and reservists with 
dependents have a tendency to have higher attrition. Older individuals at enlistment are 
also more likely to attrite than those who are at the average age.  Minorities have been 
found to have lower attrition than Caucasians in previous studies and divorced reservists 
may have lower attrition due to a need for relational belonging to the Marine Corps 
organization. 
Unit type and culture can also affect attrition.  The aviation and support MOS’s 
have a reputation of experiencing a better quality of life than the combat arms MOS’s and 
thus would expect lower attrition.  Performance is also a predictor of attrition.  Attrition 
is expected to be lower for those who get higher scores, have higher aptitude, and 
outperform others. 
Geographic areas of the country can also predict attrition.  In this thesis the 
Northeast is the base group to which the other areas are compared.  Because the 
Northeast has a reputation of being one of the most educated areas of the country, all the 
other areas are predicted to have higher attrition than the Northeast.   
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B. PROBIT REGRESSION MODEL USING COHORTS FY (1996‒2005) ‒
SAMPLE RESTRICTED TO THOSE WITH OCONUS DEPLOYMENTS 
The full cohort consists of the combined samples of USMCR NPS enlistees with a 
6X2 contract who enlisted between FY 1996 and 2005 and who deployed OCONUS at 
least once.  The sample size is 19,564.  The Pre-9/11 sub-group is omitted from the 
analysis since the sample size of OCONUS deployers was only 29.  In addition to the 
independent variables used in all the models, two cohort variables are used in order to 
evaluate differences in attrition: Overlap-9/11 enlisted in FY 1996–2001, and Post-9/11 
enlisted in FY 2002–2005.  The probit model to estimate the determinants of attrition for 
the two sub-groups is specified as follows: 
P(attrite = 1|X) = F(β0 + β1(Post-9/11)  + β2(Deployment Variables) + 
β3(Demographics) + β4(Aptitude) + β5(Regions)) 
Because attrite is a binary variable, marginal effects are used to describe the 
changes in the probability of attrition associated with a 1-unit change in each independent 
variable.  It is important to note that when analyzing the effect of an independent variable 
on attrition, all the other independent variables are held constant at their mean value.  
Table 9 reports the estimated probit coefficients and the marginal effects for the full 
sample (1996–2005) of NPS reservists with a 6X2 contract who deployed at least once 
OCONUS. 
Table 9.   Probit Attrition Model, Full Sample (1996‒2005) Restricted to Reservists with at 
Least One OCONUS Deployment 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit Results Marginal Effects 
   
Post 9/11 Cohort (FY 02 ‒05) 0.570*** 0.100*** 
 (0.0294) (0.00494) 
Deployed to AFG at least once -0.466*** -0.0633*** 
 (0.0970) (0.00922) 
Deployed to Iraq at least once -0.375*** -0.0729*** 
 (0.0298) (0.00612) 
Deployed to HFP area at least once -0.221*** -0.0456*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0166) 
Age at enlistment 0.0198*** 0.00361*** 
 (0.00565) (0.00103) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.292*** 0.0629*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0186) 
At least one Dependent -0.350*** -0.0596*** 
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit Results Marginal Effects 
 (0.0634) (0.0100) 
Married  0.210*** 0.0403*** 
 (0.0653) (0.0132) 
Divorced  -0.119 -0.0201 
 (0.0943) (0.0148) 
African American 0.0251 0.00463 
 (0.0463) (0.00866) 
Asian -0.0809 -0.0141 
 (0.0673) (0.0111) 
Race is “Other” -0.143*** -0.0244*** 
 (0.0380) (0.00605) 
Aviation MOS 0.201*** 0.0408*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0131) 
Support MOS -0.0126 -0.00230 
 (0.0263) (0.00480) 
AFQT score ≥50 -0.142*** -0.0272*** 
 (0.0293) (0.00591) 
PRO/CON scores -0.179*** -0.0326*** 
 (0.00854) (0.00155) 
Non HS Diploma 0.159*** 0.0317** 
 (0.0590) (0.0128) 
College Degree (AA, BA, MA, PhD) -0.113* -0.0193** 
 (0.0602) (0.00962) 
Midwest (WI, MI, IL, IN, OH) 0.00562 0.00103 
 (0.0584) (0.0107) 
West Midwest (ND, SD, NE, KS, 
MN, IA, MO) 
0.151** 0.0299* 
 (0.0747) (0.0160) 
Mid Atlantic (NY, PA, NJ) -0.0698 -0.0123 
 (0.0590) (0.0101) 
South Atlantic (MD, DE, DC, WV, 
VA, NC, SC, GA, FL) 
0.0998* 0.0189* 
 (0.0572) (0.0113) 
Southeast (KY, TN, MS, AL) 0.177*** 0.0353** 
 (0.0667) (0.0145) 
SE Central (OK, TX, AR, LA) 0.0761 0.0144 
 (0.0588) (0.0115) 
Mountain (MT, ID, WY, NV, UT, 
CO, AZ, NM) 
0.0393 0.00732 
 (0.0703) (0.0134) 
Pacific (CA, OR, WA, AK, HI) -0.106* -0.0184* 
 (0.0598) (0.00994) 
   
Observations 19,564 19,564 
Log Likelihood Null -7329 -7329 
Log Likelihood -6710 -6710 
Degrees of Freedom 26 26 
chi2 1239 1239 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0845 0.0845 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1. Regression Results: Cohort Dummies  
The results show that the Post-9/11 group is 10.0 percentage points more likely to 
attrite than the Overlap-9/11 group holding all other variables constant.  This contradicts 
the hypothesis that the Overlap-9/11 would be more likely to attrite.  This may be 
explained by the fact that most reservists in the Overlap-9/11 cohort deployed with more 
tenure as a reservist.  Most reservists deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
which did not begin until March, 2003.  Because the Overlap-9/11 reservists enlisted in 
FY (96–01) most would be in the later years of their six-year obligation and thus more 
mature than the Post-9/11 reservists in their first years of their obligation.   
2. Effects of Deployments 
Deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and HFP areas tend to lower attrition when 
compared to deployments to other OCONUS areas.  Reservists are 6.3 percentage points 
less likely to attrite if they are deployed to Afghanistan at least once, 7.3 percentage 
points less likely to attrite if deployed to Iraq at least once, and 4.6 percentage points less 
likely to attrite if deployed to a HFP area at least once.  This would indicate that 
reservists deployed to combat areas are more likely to remain with their units until the 
end of their obligation. 
3. Regression Results: Demographics 
Demographics factors are often included in attrition models to determine if certain 
characteristics predict attrition better than others.  By recognizing differences, leaders can 
adjust training programs and awareness to maximize efficiency and aid in planning.  
Some civilian companies have found that having on-site free child-care facilities 
improves work satisfaction and retention.  Females entail 2.3 percent of the combined 
cohort population and are 6.3 percentage points more likely to attrite than their male 
counterparts, holding all other variables constant.  This is consistent with previous 
research.  The coefficient of age indicated a 0.4 percentage point higher probability of 
attrition for every year older (than the mean age).  This indicates if enlistees are older 
when they enter, they are more likely to attrite than are younger enlistees, which is 
consistent with previous studies.  The probability of attrition for a married reservist is 4.0 
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percentage points higher than for a single reservist, while the probability of attrition for 
divorced reservists is statistically insignificant indicating no impact compared with single 
reservists.  Those with at least one dependent have a lower probability of attrition by 6.0 
percentage points (compared to reservists who have zero dependents).  When comparing 
race, the coefficients for African Americans and Asians were found to be statistically 
insignificant when compared to Whites but those in the “Other” race category (Pacific 
Islanders, American Indians, and people who failed to input a race), are 2.4 percentage 
points less likely to attrite than Caucasians.  Reservists assigned to Aviation units are 4.1 
percentage points more likely to attrite than those assigned Combat Arms MOS.  The 
coefficient of the Support MOS is statistically insignificant. 
4. Effects of Performance Variables 
This section discusses the attrition effect of performance variables such as 
education level, AFQT, and proficiency and conduct scores.  From previous studies, 
those with higher education and higher performance are expected to have lower attrition.  
The regression results indicate that individuals without a High School diploma are 3.2 
percentage points more likely to attrite than someone with a High School diploma and 
those with a college degree are 1.9 percentage points less likely to attrite.  Higher 
Proficiency and Conduct scores can also decrease the likelihood of attrition.  Increasing 
ones Pro/Con score by 0.1 point (from 4.0 to 4.1) lowers attrition by 3.3 percentage 
points.  Reservists with a high quality AFQT score (≥50) are 2.7 percentage points less 
likely to attrite than those with a low quality AFQT score.  These results are consistent 
with previous literature which predicts lower attrition for those with higher aptitude. 
5. Effects of Regional Dummies 
The region of the country an individual lives may affect attrition due to proximity 
to military bases, education, political persuasion, and economics.  Nine geographical 
regions are defined in this thesis in line with the U.S. Census designations.  The 
Northeast region (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, and VT) is used as the base region.  Four of the 
regions (Mid Atlantic – (NJ, NY, PA), the Midwest states (IL, IN, MI, WI, and OH), the 
Southeast Central (OK, AR, TX, and LA), and the Western Mountains (AZ, NM, NV, 
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UT, ID, CO, MT, and WY)) produced insignificant results and thus have no difference 
compared with the Northeast region.  One region, the Western Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA, 
and AK), is 1.8 percentage points less likely to attrite compared with the Northeast.  The 
other regions predicted a probability of attrition higher than the Northeast by varying 
amounts. The Western Midwest—(MO, ND, NE, KS, SD, MN, IA) are 3.0 percentage 
points more likely to attrite, the Southeast (KY, TN, MS, and AL) are 3.5 percentage 
points more likely to attrite, and the South Atlantic (FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, 
MD, and DE) are 1.9 percentage points more likely to attrite than the Northeast.   
C. PROBIT ATTRITION MODEL: OVERLAP-9/11 COHORT (1996‒2001) ‒
SAMPLE RESTRICTED TO RESERVISTS WITH OCONUS 
DEPLOYMENTS 
The Overlap-9/11 cohort consists of the USMCR NPS enlistees with a 6X2 
contract who enlisted in FY 1996 thru 2001 and deployed at least once OCONUS.  The 
sample size is 8,670.  The Overlap-9/11 population is unique because it consists of 
individuals who enlisted in the reserves with no expectation of mobilization or 
deployment.  When 9/11 occurred, members of this cohort had their lives completely 
upended in order to help support the Global War on Terrorism as many were mobilized 
and deployed.  The probit model to estimate the determinants of attrition is: 
P(attrite = 1|X) = F(β0 + β1(Deployment Variables) + β2(Demographics) + 
β3(Aptitude) + β4(Regions)) 
Table 10 displays the results of the probit regression and the marginal effects. 
Table 10.   Probit Attrition Model, Overlap-9/11 Cohort FY 1996‒2001 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit Results Marginal Effects 
   
Deployed to AFG at least once -0.00703 -0.000899 
 (0.165) (0.0210) 
Deployed to Iraq at least once -0.477*** -0.0576*** 
 (0.0497) (0.00555) 
Deployed to HFP area at least once -0.240*** -0.0361** 
 (0.0878) (0.0153) 
Age at enlistment 0.00307 0.000395 
 (0.00986) (0.00127) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.233* 0.0353 
 (0.131) (0.0230) 
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit Results Marginal Effects 
At least one Dependent -0.271*** -0.0329*** 
 (0.100) (0.0115) 
Married  0.216** 0.0296* 
 (0.104) (0.0151) 
Divorced  0.0494 0.00658 
 (0.165) (0.0227) 
African American -0.0742 -0.00911 
 (0.0736) (0.00862) 
Asian -0.186 -0.0210* 
 (0.116) (0.0113) 
Race is “Other” -0.280*** -0.0309*** 
 (0.0704) (0.00653) 
Aviation MOS 0.179* 0.0259 
 (0.105) (0.0170) 
Support MOS 0.0147 0.00188 
 (0.0451) (0.00577) 
AFQT score ≥50 -0.0834* -0.0111 
 (0.0507) (0.00701) 
PRO/CON scores -0.140*** -0.0181*** 
 (0.0135) (0.00174) 
Non HS Diploma 0.191* 0.0280 
 (0.110) (0.0183) 
College Degree (AA, BA, MA, PhD) -0.0659 -0.00811 
 (0.101) (0.0118) 
Midwest (WI, MI, IL, IN, OH) 0.134 0.0185 
 (0.112) (0.0165) 
West Midwest (ND, SD, NE, KS, 
MN, IA, MO) 
0.558*** 0.103*** 
 (0.139) (0.0341) 
Mid Atlantic (NY, PA, NJ) 0.0567 0.00750 
 (0.112) (0.0153) 
South Atlantic (MD, DE, DC, WV, 
VA, NC, SC, GA, FL) 
0.221** 0.0316* 
 (0.109) (0.0172) 
Southeast (KY, TN, MS, AL) 0.171 0.0246 
 (0.128) (0.0203) 
SE Central (OK, TX, AR, LA) 0.205* 0.0295* 
 (0.109) (0.0174) 
Mountain (MT, ID, WY, NV, UT, 
CO, AZ, NM) 
0.232* 0.0345* 
 (0.122) (0.0209) 
Pacific (CA, OR, WA, AK, HI) 0.0843 0.0113 
 (0.114) (0.0160) 
   
Observations 8,670 8,670 
Log Likelihood Null -2376 -2376 
Log Likelihood -2219 -2219 
Degrees of Freedom 25 25 
chi2 314.9 314.9 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0663 0.0663 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1. Effects of Deployments 
Reservists who deployed to Iraq at least once are 5.8 percentage points less likely 
to attrite than those who were deployed OCONUS but did not go to Iraq.  Those deployed 
to a HFP area are 3.6 percentage points less likely to attrite than those who did not deploy 
to a HFP area.  Reservists who deployed to Afghanistan have no statistical significance 
and thus attrition is not affected.  This is most likely due to only 1.6 percent of this 
sample was deployed to Afghanistan. 
2. Effects of Demographics 
Numerous variables in the demographics section of this cohort were found to be 
statistically insignificant including age at enlistment, divorced, African American, Asian, 
and the Support MOS category.  The other variables remained consistent with previous 
findings.  Females are 3.5 percentage points more likely to attrite compared with their 
male counterparts.  Reservists with at least one dependent are 3.3 percentage points less 
likely to attrite compared with reservists who have no dependents.  Those labeled as 
“Other Race” are 3.1 percentage points less likely to attrite compared with Caucasians.  
Reservists with an aviation MOS are 2.6 percentage points more likely to attrite 
compared with those in a combat arms MOS. 
3. Effects of Performance 
This section is also consistent with the Total cohort.  Reservists with a high 
quality AFQT score are 1.1 percentage points less likely to attrite compared with those 
with a low quality AFQT score.  If reservists increase their Pro/Con scores by 0.1 point, 
they are less likely to attrite by 1.8 percentage points.  Reservists without a HS diploma 
are 2.8 percentage points more likely to attrite compared with those with a HS diploma. 
4. Effects of Regional Dummies 
Although the coefficients for the Southeast, Mid Atlantic, Midwest, and Pacific 
were found to be insignificant, the other regions all predict higher attrition than the 
Northeast region.  The Western Midwest is 10.3 percentage points higher attrition than 
the Northeast.   
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The South Atlantic predicts 3.2 percentage points higher, the Central Southeast is 2.9 
percentage points higher, and the Western Mountains are 3.5 percentage points higher 
attrition than the Northeast. 
D. PROBIT ATTRITION MODEL: POST-9/11 COHORT (2002‒2005) ‒
SAMPLE RESTRICTED TO RESERVISTS WITH OCONUS 
DEPLOYMENTS 
The Post-9/11 cohort consists of the USMCR NPS enlistees with a 6X2 contract 
who enlisted in FY 2002 thru 2005 and deployed at least once OCONUS.  The sample 
size is 10,894.  The Post-9/11 cohort is unique because it consists of individuals who 
enlisted in the reserves with full expectation of mobilization and deployment.  U.S. 
Marines had been conducting combat operations in Afghanistan since October of 2002, 
and began combat operations in Iraq in March of 2003.  There was never a period that 
Marines were not deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism.  The probit model 
to estimate the determinants of attrition is: 
P(attrite = 1|X) = F(β0 + β1(Deployment Variables) + β2(Demographics) + 
β3(Aptitude) + β4(Regions)) 
Table 11 displays the results of the probit regression and the marginal effects.    
Table 11.   Probit Attrition Model: Post-9/11 Cohort FY 2002‒2005 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit Results Marginal Effects 
   
Deployed to AFG at least once -0.703*** -0.109*** 
 (0.128) (0.0116) 
Deployed to Iraq at least once -0.327*** -0.0828*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0108) 
Deployed to HFP area at least once -0.240* -0.0614 
 (0.143) (0.0405) 
Age at enlistment 0.0294*** 0.00670*** 
 (0.00699) (0.00159) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.331*** 0.0877*** 
 (0.0916) (0.0276) 
At least one Dependent -0.398*** -0.0841*** 
 (0.0820) (0.0160) 
Married  0.210** 0.0498** 
 (0.0841) (0.0209) 
Divorced  -0.187 -0.0386* 
 (0.115) (0.0213) 
African American 0.106* 0.0254* 
 (0.0605) (0.0151) 
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit Results Marginal Effects 
Asian -0.0191 -0.00430 
 (0.0836) (0.0187) 
Race is “Other” -0.0685 -0.0152 
 (0.0458) (0.00988) 
Aviation MOS 0.189*** 0.0468** 
 (0.0728) (0.0195) 
Support MOS -0.0229 -0.00523 
 (0.0326) (0.00745) 
AFQT score ≥50 -0.173*** -0.0415*** 
 (0.0363) (0.00914) 
PRO/CON scores -0.206*** -0.0469*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00254) 
Non HS Diploma 0.149** 0.0363** 
 (0.0704) (0.0183) 
College Degree (AA, BA, MA, PhD) -0.148* -0.0313** 
 (0.0755) (0.0148) 
Midwest (WI, MI, IL, IN, OH) -0.0410 -0.00918 
 (0.0694) (0.0153) 
West Midwest (ND, SD, NE, KS, 
MN, IA, MO) 
-0.0134 -0.00303 
 (0.0891) (0.0200) 
Mid Atlantic (NY, PA, NJ) -0.109 -0.0237 
 (0.0707) (0.0147) 
South Atlantic (MD, DE, DC, WV, 
VA, NC, SC, GA, FL) 
0.0655 0.0152 
 (0.0683) (0.0162) 
Southeast (KY, TN, MS, AL) 0.203** 0.0505** 
 (0.0793) (0.0214) 
SE Central (OK, TX, AR, LA) 0.0349 0.00805 
 (0.0716) (0.0167) 
Mountain (MT, ID, WY, NV, UT, 
CO, AZ, NM) 
-0.0478 -0.0106 
 (0.0883) (0.0192) 
Pacific (CA, OR, WA, AK, HI) -0.170** -0.0363** 
 (0.0712) (0.0143) 
   
Observations 10,894 10,894 
Log Likelihood Null -4796 -4796 
Log Likelihood -4450 -4450 
Degrees of Freedom 25 25 
chi2 693.5 693.5 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0723 0.0723 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
1. Effects of Deployments 
Indicators of deployment to Iraq, Afghanistan, and HFP areas once again 
predicted lower attrition compared with those did not deploy to these areas.  Reservists 
with Afghanistan deployments are 10.9 percentage points less likely to attrite compared 
with those who have never deployed to Afghanistan, holding all other variables constant.  
Iraq deployments are 8.3 percentage points less likely to attrite, and HFP deployments are 
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6.1 percentage points less likely to attrite compared with those who never deployed to a 
HFP area.  Deploying to these dangerous areas seems to be good for retention. 
2. Effects of Demographics   
For every year over 20 years of age at enlistment, attrition is predicted to be 0.7 
percentage points higher.  Females are 8.8 percentage points more likely to attrite than 
their male counterparts.  Reservists with at least one dependent are 8.4 percentage points 
less likely to attrite than those without a dependent.  Married reservists are 5.0 percentage 
points more likely to attrite than single reservists.  The coefficients of divorce, Asian, 
Other race, and Support MOS were all statistically insignificant.  African Americans are 
2.5 percentage points more likely to attrite than Caucasians.  Reservists in the aviation 
field are 4.7 percentage points more likely to attrite compared to those with a combat 
arms MOS. 
3. Effects of Performance 
Reservists in the high quality AFQT score category are 4.2 percentage points less 
likely to attrite than those with a low quality AFQT score.  Reservists who increase their 
proficiency and conduct scores by 0.1 points are 4.7 percentage points less likely to 
attrite.  Reservists without a High School diploma are 3.6 percentage points more likely 
to attrite than those who have earned a High School diploma and those with a college 
degree are 3.1 percentage points less likely to attrite. 
4. Effects of Regional Dummies 
Most of the geographic regions had insignificant coefficients.  Only reservists 
from the Southeast region and the Pacific region had significant results.  The Southeast is 
5.1 percentage points more likely to attrite, but those from the Pacific region are 3.6 
percentage points less likely to attrite. 
E. PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS FOR UNRESTRICTED MODEL 
COHORTS FY (1994–2005) 
The previous models did not include the Pre-9/11 cohort because the models only 
analyzed reservists who deployed OCONUS at least once.  In this section, the Pre-9/11 
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cohort is included to analyze any differences related to attrition between the 3 cohorts.  
This model does not include deployment variables because the reservists in the Pre-9/11 
cohort did not have the opportunity to deploy.  The probit model to estimate the 
determinants of attrition for the total sample FY (1994–2005) is: 
P(attrite = 1|X) = F(β0 + β1(Overlap-9/11) + β2(Post-9/11) + β3(Demographics) + 
β4(Aptitude) + β5(Regions)) 
Table 12 displays the probit model results in four columns.  Column (1) is the 
total USMCR NPS population who enlisted with a 6X2 contract from FY 1994 through 
2005.  Column (2) includes the Pre-9/11 cohort which is all USMCR NPS marines who 
enlisted with a 6X2 contract in FY 1994 and 1995.  Column (3) is the Overlap-9/11 
cohort which includes all USMCR NPS marines who enlisted with a 6X2 contact in FY 
(1996–2001).  Column (4) is the Post-9/11 cohort which comprises all the USMCR NPS 















Table 12.   Probit Attrition Model -- Unrestricted Sample FY (1994‒2005) 








VARIABLES Marginal Effects Marginal Effects Marginal Effects Marginal Effects 
     
Overlap 9/11 Cohort (FY 96 ‒05)  -0.0781***    
 (0.00561)    
Post 9/11 Cohort (FY 02 ‒05) -0.0841***    
 (0.00576)    
Age at enlistment 0.0146*** 0.0105*** 0.0156*** 0.0147*** 
 (0.000955) (0.00277) (0.00129) (0.00164) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.186*** 0.206*** 0.198*** 0.163*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0375) (0.0147) (0.0191) 
At least one Dependent -0.131*** -0.167*** -0.130*** -0.127*** 
 (0.00886) (0.0244) (0.0116) (0.0163) 
Married  -0.00974 0.0269 -0.0240* 0.0121 
 (0.0105) (0.0309) (0.0138) (0.0191) 
Divorced  -0.103*** -0.0569 -0.0911*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0510) (0.0214) (0.0226) 
African American -0.0120* -0.0119 -0.0171* 0.00810 
 (0.00681) (0.0168) (0.00883) (0.0141) 
Asian -0.0716*** -0.0809*** -0.101*** -0.0148 
 (0.00976) (0.0265) (0.0125) (0.0185) 
Race is “Other” -0.0510*** -0.0718*** -0.0657*** -0.0228** 
 (0.00586) (0.0157) (0.00802) (0.0103) 
Aviation MOS 0.0484*** 0.126*** 0.0299** 0.0448*** 
 (0.00919) (0.0248) (0.0123) (0.0163) 
Support MOS 0.0307*** 0.0660*** 0.0242*** 0.0264*** 
 (0.00452) (0.0117) (0.00618) (0.00805) 
AFQT score ≥50 -0.000878 0.0308** 0.00277 -0.0243*** 
 (0.00493) (0.0126) (0.00665) (0.00908) 
PRO/CON scores -0.0700*** -0.0804*** -0.0603*** -0.0870*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00277) (0.00145) (0.00229) 
Non HS Diploma 0.0288*** 0.0278 0.0281* 0.0365** 
 (0.0106) (0.0295) (0.0150) (0.0177) 
College Degree (AA, BA, MA, PhD) -0.0176* -0.0193 -0.0350*** 0.0163 
 (0.00965) (0.0248) (0.0130) (0.0177) 
Midwest (WI, MI, IL, IN, OH) -0.000806 0.0263 -0.00407 -0.00746 
 (0.0103) (0.0270) (0.0143) (0.0177) 
West Midwest (ND, SD, NE, KS, MN, 
IA, MO) 
0.0434*** 0.0559* 0.0564*** 0.0114 
 (0.0133) (0.0338) (0.0187) (0.0225) 
Mid Atlantic (NY, PA, NJ) -0.0170* 0.0330 -0.0220 -0.0298* 
 (0.0102) (0.0274) (0.0141) (0.0174) 
South Atlantic (MD, DE, DC, WV, 
VA, NC, SC, GA, FL) 
0.0441*** 0.0613** 0.0347** 0.0527*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0266) (0.0144) (0.0180) 
Southeast (KY, TN, MS, AL) 0.0462*** 0.0350 0.0410** 0.0707*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0314) (0.0172) (0.0226) 
SE Central (OK, TX, AR, LA) 0.0293*** 0.0228 0.0329** 0.0281 
 (0.0108) (0.0273) (0.0150) (0.0188) 
Mountain (MT, ID, WY, NV, UT, CO, 
AZ, NM) 
0.100*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 0.0561** 
 (0.0133) (0.0343) (0.0187) (0.0227) 
Pacific (CA, OR, WA, AK, HI) 0.0118 0.0589** 0.0226 -0.0233 
 (0.0104) (0.0272) (0.0146) (0.0172) 
     
Observations 56,541 9,344 29,797 17,400 
Log Likelihood Null -35331 -6077 -18442 -10776 
Log Likelihood -32211 -5465 -16920 -9705 
Degrees of Freedom 24 22 22 22 
chi2 6239 1226 3044 2141 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0883 0.101 0.0825 0.0994 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1. Regression Results for the Full Sample of the Unrestricted Sample FY 
(1994–2005) 
From Column (1) of Table 12, the results indicate that the Post-9/11 cohort is 8.4 
percentage points less likely to attrite than the Pre-9/11 cohort and the Overlap-9/11 
cohort is 7.8 percentage points less likely to attrite than the Pre-9/11 cohort holding all 
other variables constant.  This would suggest that the events of 9/11 had a positive impact 
on retention related to this sample.   
2. Regression Results: Demographics 
Females have a consistently higher probability of attrition over their male 
counterparts throughout the time period.  The percentage points effect decreased from 
20.6 in the Pre-9/11 cohort to 16.3 in the Post-9/11 cohort indicating a 5.4 percent 
improvement of retention of females from the Pre-9/11 period to the Post-9/11 period.  
The impact of age at enlistment on attrition remained low for all three cohorts ranging 
from 1.1 to 1.6 percentage point higher probability of attrition for every year older (than 
the mean age).  Having at least one dependent reduced the attrition rate, and the effect fell 
from 16.7 percentage point in the Pre-9/11 cohort to 12.7 percentage points in the Post-
9/11 cohort.  This corresponds with 6 percent higher attrition from the Pre-9/11 period to 
the Post-9/11 period on those with at least one dependent.  The effect of being divorced 
was insignificant in the Pre-9/11 cohort, but in the two subsequent groups it was 
associated with lower attrition (by 9.1 and 12.8 percentage points in the Overlap-9/11 
cohort and the Post-9/11 cohort, respectively).  The effect of being married and African 
American were insignificant in most cohorts. The coefficient of Asian was statistically 
insignificant in the Post-9/11 cohort but predicted 8.1 to 10.1 percentage lower attrition in 
the other cohorts.  The “Other” race also predicted lower attrition, but ranged from 7.2 
points lower in the Pre-9/11 cohort to only 2.3 percentage points lower in the Post-9/11 
cohort.  This is a 12.9 percent increase in attrition for Asians from Pre-9/11 to Post-9/11.  
The Aviation and Support MOS reservists all predicted higher attrition than the Combat 
Arms MOS.  The Aviation marines ranged from 12.6 percentage points higher in the Pre-
9/11 cohort to 4.5 percentage points in the Post-9/11 cohort (20 percent lower attrition 
from Pre-9/11 to Post-9/11).  The Support marines ranged from 6.6 percentage points 
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higher attrition than the Combat Arms MOS in the Pre-9/11 cohort to 2.6 percentage 
points higher in the Post-9/11 cohort (10.2 percent lower attrition from Pre-9/11 to Post-
9/11).  Although still higher than the Combat Arms MOS, there does appear to be a 
decreasing trend. 
3. Regression Results: Performance Variables  
This section discusses the attrition effect of performance variables such as 
education level, AFQT, and proficiency and conduct scores.  The only variable in this 
section which provided solid results with all three cohorts reporting significant 
coefficients was the proficiency and conduct scores variable.  Reservists are predicted to 
have between 6.0 and 8.7 percentage points lower attrition for each 0.1 increase in their 
pro/con scores depending on which cohort they belong.  The high quality AFQT score 
(≥50) predicted mixed results with the Pre-9/11 cohort 3.0 percentage points higher, the 
Overlap-9/11 cohort insignificant, and the Post-9/11 cohort predicting 2.4 percentage 
points lower attrition than the low quality AFQT score.  The education variable also had 
some insignificant coefficients.  The non-HS Diploma variable did predict 2.8 to 3.7 
percentage points higher attrition for the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 cohorts compared to 
those reservists who had a HS diploma.  The only significant result for the college degree 
variable was the Overlap-9/11 cohort which predicted 3.5 percentage points lower 
attrition than those with a HS diploma.   
4. Regression Results: Regional Dummies 
The region of the country an individual lives may affect attrition due to proximity 
to military bases, education, political persuasion, and economics.  Nine geographical 
regions are defined in this thesis in line with the U.S. Census designations.  The 
Northeast region (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, and VT) is used as the base region.  Four of the 
regions (Mid Atlantic - NJ, NY, PA), the Midwest states (IL, IN, MI, WI, and OH), the 
Southeast Central (OK, AR, TX, and LA), and the Western Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA, 
and AK) had insignificant coefficients.  Reservists located in the other regions all had a 
probability of attrition higher than for those in the Northeast.  The Western Mountains 
(AZ, NM, NV, UT, ID, CO, MT, and WY) averaged 10.0 percentage points more likely 
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to attrite, the Southeast (KY, TN, MS, and AL) averaged 4.6 percentage points more 
likely to attrite, the South Atlantic (FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, and DE) 
averaged 4.4 percentage points more likely, and the Western Midwest—(MO, ND, NE, 
KS, SD, MN, IA) averaged 4.3 percentage points more likely to attrite than the Northeast. 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, two separate models were analyzed to determine the effects of 
various variables on attrition.  The first model restricted the sample to only those 
reservists who deployed at least once OCONUS.  This eliminated the Pre-9/11 cohort for 
analysis due to the fact that only 29 reservists (0.3 percent) in this cohort actually 
deployed OCONUS.  This model predicted lower attrition for reservists deployed to 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and HFP areas compared to reservists who deployed OCONUS but did 
not operate in these areas.   
The second model included the unrestricted sample of reservists in order to 
capture determinants of attrition with the Pre-9/11 cohort.  The model predicted lower 
attrition for the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 cohorts compared to the Pre-9/11 cohort.  
When comparing the two models on demographics, both predicted increased attrition for 
the older age at enlistment, females over males, married vice single, and aviation MOS 
over combat arms MOS.  Both models also predicted lower attrition for reservists with at 
least one dependent, and those whose race was “other” compared to Caucasians.  The 
African American, Asian, divorced, and support MOS variables were inconsistent with at 
least one of the models producing insignificant results with those variables. 
When comparing the education and aptitude variables between the two models, 
only the Pro/Con variable consistently predicted significant and similar results.  Both 
models predicted lower attrition with an increase in the Pro/Con scores.  The other 
variables were inconsistent when comparing the two models.  Because the coefficients 




The geographic regions mostly proved to be inconsistent or insignificant when 
comparing the two models.  Three areas did coincide with the two models and produce 
significant coefficients; the Western Midwest, South Atlantic, and the Southeastern 




VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVIEW 
The goal of this thesis was to determine the determinants of attrition on USMCR 
NPS marines with a 6X2 contract who enlisted from 1994 through 2005.  The analysis 
revolved around the events of September 11, 2001 to determine if characteristics of the 
population were different before and after the terrorist attacks on the American 
homeland.  The population was divided into three cohorts; the Pre-9/11 cohort enlisted in 
FY 1994 and 1995 and completed the their six-year obligation prior to 9/11, the Overlap-
9/11 cohort enlisted between FY 1996 and 2001 (before 9/11) and whose 6-year 
commitment expired sometime after 9/11, and the Post-9/11 cohort which enlisted in FY 
2002–2005 after 9/11.  Numerous variables were analyzed, these included deployment 
characteristics, demographics, education and aptitude, and regional differences. 
The data on the reservists was collected from the TFDW, MCRISS, and the 
Bureau of Labor and Statistics.  Monthly snapshots of each reservist were collected to 
form a panel dataset consisting of over 3.5 million observations from the years 1994–
2011.  The data was then compiled, combined, and compressed to keep only the last 
observation of each reservist.  This presented an overall picture of the reservists 
characteristics as well as made it possible to determine if the individual completed their 
6-year obligation or if they left the reserves early as an attrite. 
A thorough literature review was performed in Chapter II including previous 
studies on active duty and reservists in all the United States armed forces with an 
emphasis on the Marine Corps.  Many of the hypotheses of this thesis were derived from 
the literature review.  Chapter IV presented the Descriptive Statistics.  Two different 
models using two different data samples were analyzed.  The first model was a restricted 
model to measure the effects of deployment on attrition.  It used only those reservists 
who deployed OCONUS.  Because reservists in the Pre-9/11 cohort did not have the 
opportunities to deploy, the cohort was omitted from analysis in the first model due to 
lack of observations.  The second model included all three cohorts, but did not include 
 62 
the deployment variables.  This allowed analysis to compare the difference in behavior 
between the three cohorts and determine characteristics which may have changed from 
before to after 9/11.  Chapter V performed the data analysis of the two models using 
probit regressions and then compared the results to determine the significance of the 
results.  If both models produced similar results, it can be inferred that the outcome is 
credible. 
B. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Attrition has declined from 36.1 percent in the Pre-9/11 cohort to 30.1 percent in 
the Post-9/11 cohort.  The events of 9/11 seem to have lowered attrition rates.  This is 
most likely explained by deployments and the unemployment rate.  Reservists who 
deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and HFP areas were consistently found to be less likely to 
attrite than those reservists who deployed OCONUS but did not participate in these areas.  
This indicates that deploying in support of the Global War on Terrorism decreases 
attrition.  It is not clear whether the attrition is lower due to the individuals’ needs or the 
Marine Corps needs.  Individuals may have an increased sense of purpose and desire to 
support and defend the United States and thus stick with their obligation, or it could be 
the Marine Corps reluctance to let people go due to necessity of deployment 
requirements.  Either way, the attrition is lower due to deployments.  Another factor in 
lower attrition after 9/11 is an increased unemployment rate.  The unemployment rate for 
individual reservists averaged 4.5 percent in the Pre-9/11 cohort and then increased to 7.0 
percent for the Post-9/11 cohort.  Previous studies have all found lower attrition rates are 
correlated with higher unemployment rates due to lack of opportunity in the civilian 
sector.  Further analysis is needed to determine how much impact the unemployment rate 
had on attrition of this population of reservists. 
The effects of reservist’s demographic characteristics were mostly consistent with 
the previous literature.  However, one exception is the finding that reservists with at least 
one dependent have lower attrition.  The previous literature predicts higher attrition for 
those with more dependents.  Women continue to have higher attrition than men, but 
there is evidence that after 9/11 the percentage rate decreased indicating an improvement.  
Many of the results for minorities were insignificant, but when the results were 
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significant, they indicated lower attrition for minorities than Caucasians, which coincides 
with previous studies.  Reservists with an Aviation MOS are more likely to attrite than 
those with a combat arms MOS but the rates decreased from Pre-9/11 to Post-9/11 
indicating improvement in this group. The education, aptitude, and regional variables also 
produced a combination of insignificant coefficients or expected results.  The strongest 
supported finding was increased pro/con scores predict decreased attrition which was 
expected. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Attrition in this thesis was calculated using panel data collected over the course of 
an individual reservist’s six-year enlistment.  Because many intended data fields were 
incomplete or blank, the only accurate way to determine attrition was to analyze the 
reservist’s last data entry and determine how many months he or she had left on their 
contract.  If the reservist failed to complete their six-year commitment, they were 
determined to be an attrite.  The data fields indicating why a reservist separated was often 
left incomplete, so there was no way of knowing why the individual separated.  There are 
many reasons why a reservist separates early.  Some reasons are negative such as due to 
misconduct, legal, or medical issues, whereas other separations may not actually 
constitute a loss to the Marine Corps such as a transfer to a different unit, to the active 
duty, or to an officer program.  In this thesis, there was no way to determine acceptable 
unit attrition (losses to other reserve or active units) from negative attrition (losses to 
civilian life).  Future research should try to restrict the analysis to the negative attrition 
(losses to civilian life).   
Although the increased unemployment rates from Pre-9/11 to Post-9/11 have 
impacted attrition, we are unsure by how much.  Future studies could attempt to 
determine the quantitative impact of changes in the unemployment rate on attrition over 
this period.   
In January of 2007, Marine Corps Commandant, General James T. Conway issued 
ALMAR 002/07 EVERY MARINE INTO THE FIGHT- COMMANDANT’S INTENT 
(Conway, 2007).  The guidance was to get every Marine to the fight at least once.  In this 
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study, it was determined that deploying to combat decreases attrition.  Not only was the 
Commandant trying to decrease the burden on Marines with multiple deployments by 
implementing this policy, but he was also decreasing attrition.  This is a good policy and 
should continue for future conflicts.   
In summary, Americans enlist in the Marine Corps knowing the risk of going to 
war.  The Marine Corps has a reputation of being the first to fight.  The results in this 
thesis suggest that deployment to conflict areas is associated with lower attrition.  As the 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down and the economy improves, there is a 
real possibility of increased attrition back to Pre-9/11 levels.  It is imperative that the 
USMCR leadership recognizes the challenges ahead and implements policies, training, 
and recruiting efforts to anticipate these dynamics. 
  
 65 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Conway, J. T. (2007). ALMAR 002/07 EVERY MARINE INTO THE FIGHT-
COMMANDANT'S INTENT. Washington DC: Commandant of the Marine Corps. 
Doering, Z. D., & Grissmer, D. W. (1985). Active and Reserve Force Attrition and 
Retention: A Selected Review of Research and Methods. Santa Monica: The Rand 
Corporation. 
Dolfini-Reed, M. A., Parcell, A. D., Gregory, D., & Horne, B. C. (2005). Determining 
Patterns of Reserve Attrition Since September 11, 2001. Alexandria: CNA. 
Flynn, D. (2011, December 20). Active Reserve program offers options for Marines. 
Retrieved from Marine Corps Recruiting Command: 
http://www.marines.mil/unit/mcrc/Pages/ActiveReserveprogram.aspx#.TvDaQHr
NINE 
Grissmer, D. W., & Kirby, S. N. (1985). Attrition of Nonprior-Service Reservists in the 
Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. 
Grissmer, D. W., & Kirby, S. N. (1988). Changing Patterns of Nonprior Service Attrition 
in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Santa Monica: The RAND 
Corporation. 
Hattiangadi, A. U., & Parcell, A. D. (2006). SelRes Attrition and the Selected Reserve 
Incentive Program in the Marine Corps Reserve. Alexandria: CNA. 
Kirby, S. N., & Grissmer, D. W. (1993). Reassessing Enlisted Reserve Attrition: A Total 
Force Perspective. Santa Monica: RAND. 
Lizarraga, J. M. (2011). Patterns of Marine Corps Reserve Continuation Behavior: Pre- 
and Post-9/11. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. 
MCO 1001R.1K. (2009). Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual 
(MCRAMM). Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy. 
Price, J. D. (2010). Effects of Activation on Selected Marine Corps Reserve Prior Service 
Enlisted Continuation Rates in the Post-9/11 Era. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
Wenger, J. W. (2010). Expanding the Recruiting Market: Noncognitive Testing. 
Alexandria: CNA. 
Wenger, J. W., & Hodari, A. K. (2004). Final Analysis of Evaluation of Homeschool and 
ChalleNGe Program Recruits. Alexandria: CNA. 
 66 
Wenger, J. W., & Hodari, A. K. (2004). Predictors of Attrition: Attitudes, Behaviors, and 
Educational Characteristics. Alexandria: CNA. 
 
 67 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Attn: RAP) 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
6. Stephen L. Mehay 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. Jeremy A. Arkes 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
8. LtCol Jonathan D. Price 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Attn: RAP) 
Quantico, VA 
 
